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1. BACKGROUND
Given the way that the controversy over the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger was portrayed in the media,
one might conclude that the dispute was solely about U.S. and
EU authorities attempting to protect their national interests and
their own "national champion" aircraft manufacturer. As has
been previously pointed out,' however, the Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas merger raised a number of controversial economic and
legal questions, and the differing conclusions reached on opposite
sides of the Atlantic can also be explained by fundamental
differences in the legal philosophies and economic assumptions of
the U.S. and European merger-review authorities. This article
attempts to identify and elaborate on some of these differences as
manifested in the opposing conclusions in the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case. Without attempting to resolve
which enforcement body's approach is preferable, the article
identifies various limitations and questionable economic
assumptions underlying each body's analysis and concludes that
both sides of the Atlantic could benefit from a more balanced and
comprehensive approach.
The article begins, in Section 1, by providing the background
for the dispute over the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger,
including: (1) identifying the U.S. and EU bodies responsible for
* J.D., Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, 1998. The author, a
member of the New York State Bar, is currently serving as a law clerk to Judge
Allen G. Schwartz in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The author wishes to extend his thanks to Harvard
Law School Professor Louis Kaplow for his helpful insights and comments
during the preparation of this article.
' See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders:
The United States of Boeing Versus the European Union of Airbus, BROOKINGS
REV., Winter 1998, at 30.
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enforcing the antitrust laws and, in particular, for reviewing
horizontal mergers for compliance with those laws; (2) explaining
the basic goals and emphases of U.S. and EU antitrust law, with a
focus on horizontal mergers; and (3) briefly presenting the recent
history of the commercial aircraft market in order to provide the
context in which the respective merger review bodies analyzed
the proposed merger. Section 2 attempts to explain why the
United States and the European Union came to conflicting
conclusions as to whether the merger would harm competition in
the commercial aircraft market. After discussing why both
merger review authorities considered the merger, on its face, to
raise serious anticompetitive concerns, Section 2 explains why
differing legal philosophies and contrasting economic assumptions
caused the two bodies to reach different conclusions with respect
to three important aspects of the merger: (1) the "competitive
potential" of McDonnell-Douglas in the commercial aircraft
market; (2) the significance of the fact that enormous efficiencies
were expected to be generated by the merger; and (3) the
importance and relevance of the exclusive supply contracts that
had been entered into between Boeing and three major U.S.
airlines. Section 3 sets forth the settlement that was eventually
reached between the European Union and Boeing, and, with the
aid of two years of hindsight, provides a brief substantive critique
of the U.S. and EU enforcement bodies' analyses of the merger.
1.1. The U.S. and EUAntitrust Authorities
Authority for reviewing mergers for compliance with the
antitrust laws exists on a multitude of levels in both the United
States and the European Union. Merger control authority in the
United States is delegated primarily to two federal agencies: the
Department of Justice ('DOJ") and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"). In addition, each state, through its
attorney general, is entitled to enforce its own antitrust laws,
although only a few have true merger control laws.' Federal
2 See Jason A. Garick, International Horizontal Mergers: A Comparison of
European Union and United States Regulatory Policy and Procedure, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 294 (1994). Aithough every state has its own antitrust
laws, only twelve have merger control regulations: Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas,
and Washington. See Barry E. Hawk & Laraine L. Laudati, Antitrust
Federalism in the United States and Decentralization of Competition Law
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approval of a proposed international horizontal merger in the
United States does not prevent individual states from acting
alone? However, because most states have limited amounts of
resources, by far the primary governmental4 bodies engaged in
real merger-regulation are the FTC and DOJ.s Similarly, in the
European Union, merger enforcement occurs at both the member
state and EU levels. However, only one body will obtain the
right to challenge the merger, depending on whether the merger
meets certain "thresholds." The EU authorities have jurisdiction
when a merger's impact is: (1) large enough to give it a
"Community Dimension," and (2) diffuse enough such that its
impact is not primarily confined to one member state
In the United States, the DOJ enforces the Sherman Act' and,
jointly with the FTC, the Clayton Act.9 Since horizontal merger
review falls under the rubric of Section Seven of the Clayton Act,
the DOJ effectively shares enforcement duties with the FTC.
The DOJ and FTC (jointly referred to as the "Agencies")
developed a common agency framework for evaluating horizontal
mergers, which they published most recently in the 1992
Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 18,
21 n.13 (1996).
3 See Garick, supra note 2, at 294.
4 In the United States, private plaintiffs are also permitted to sue to enjoin
a merger that violates the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1994). It is more
difficult for a competitor of the merging companies to sue because of the
requirement of "antitrust injury." See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (prohibiting the country's fifth largest beef packer
from challenging a merger between the second and third largest meatpackers).
Firms that do business with the merging companies, however, may use private
suits as a method of preventing perceived anticompetitive mergers.
' There was a noticeable rejuvenation of state antitrust enforcement in the
1980s because of the drop in federal enforcement. See Hawk & Laudati, supra
note 2, at 20.
6 See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989, Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14, 16
[hereinafter EU Merger Regulation] (asserting EU-level authority when either:
(1) the combined world aggregate turnover of the merging companies is over
ECU 5 billion, or where (2 both the turnover in the European Union is over
ECU 250 million, and each of the merging firms does not possess over two-
thirds of its turnover in one particular member state).
7 See id.
8 See 15 U.S.C. 5 1-9 (1994).
9 See id. § 18.
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Horizontal Merger Guidelines."° The DOJ does not have the
authority to block a merger on its own- it must commence an
action to enjoin the merger under the applicable statute in federal
district court. The DOJ is headed by the Attorney General of the
United States, who is appointed by the President for an indefinite
term. The Antitrust Division of the DOJ is headed by an
assistant attorney general, also appointed for an indefinite term.
At the time of the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger, the
Attorney General was Janet Reno.
The FTC is an independent regulatory agency that was
created by the Federal Trade Commission Act" and which
enforces the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. 2 The
FTC, unlike the DOJ, has full authority to investigate, prosecute,
and adjudicate applications for merger approval. A decision by an
administrative law judge in favor of the prosecuting arm of the
FTC- thus blocking the merger- can be appealed first to the full
commission, and then to a federal appeals court.13 The FTC is
headed by five commissioners appointed by the President for
seven year terms, during which they cannot be removed except
"for cause."'4 The division of the FTC responsible for evaluating
mergers is the Bureau of Competition. At the time of the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger, the Chairman of the FTC
was former Georgetown Law professor Robert Pitofsky.
In the European Union, mergers that meet the applicable
thresholds are reviewed by the Commission of the European
Communities ("European Commission" or "Commission"). The
Commission is usually considered the executive branch of the
European Union, although it exercises "a melange of all the
1" See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (visited Nov. 17, 1999)
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm [hereinafter Horizontal Merger
Guidelines]. The 1992 guidelines were modified in 1997 to reflect a more
favorable view of efficiencies but are still referred to as the 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Unless otherwise stated, the references within this article
pertain to the 1997 version.
11 See 15 U.S.C. S 41 (1999).
12 See id. 5 13 (dealing with "discrimination in price, services, or facilities").
13 See id. § 45(c).
14 Commissioners may only be removed for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office." Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623
(1935).
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branches' functions."15 The members of the Commission are
appointed by member states to serve five-year terms.16 The
Commission's work is primarily done by civil servants, divided
into twenty-three Directorates-Generale.17 Directorate General
IV ("DG IV") is responsible for competition matters, including
merger regulation, but final decisions must be approved by the
entire twenty member Commission." The Commission is often
considered to be subject to somewhat more political pressure than
the U.S. regulatory authorities, but it has proven its ability to
make politically unpopular decisions. 9 The Commission has the
authority to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate all issues related
to the merger. A final ruling by the Commission may, however,
be appealed to the European Court of Justice.'0 A Minister of
Competition, at the head of DG IV, is generally responsible for
investigating mergers for the Commission. At the time of the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger, the EU Competition
Minister was Karel Van Miert, a Commissioner from Belgium.
1.2. A General Difference in Focus
One formulation of the general economic purposes of merger
regulation is to prevent the use of mergers to "enhance market
power or facilitate its exercise."21 There are, generally, at least
15 Alissa A. Meade, Note, Modeling A European Competition Authority, 46
DUKE LJ. 153, 157 (1996).
16 See id. at 157 n.18 (citing JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 54 (1993)).
,7 See id. at 157.
18 See Hawk & Laudati, supra note 2, at 31.
19 See, e.g., Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals, and
Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the
European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 451-52 (1996) ("While Politics is not
absent from the [DOJ] or [FTC], it is less obvious than in the Commission,
where the twenty commissioners represent fifteen political and legal systems.").
A number of recent commentators have criticized the vulnerability of the
Commission to political pressure and, in particular, lobbying from member
states. See, e.g., Meade, supra note 15, at 167 n.78. The Commission's
controversial decision to block a merger in de Havilland, however, was against
intense lobbying efforts by some member states. See infra text accompanying
notes 125-128 (discussing Commission Decision IV/M.053, Re the
Concentration Between Aerospatiale SNI and Aleni-Aeritalia E Selenia SpA
and de Havilland, 1991 Oj. (L 334) 42, 4 C.M.L.R. M2 (1992) [hereinafter de
Havilland]).
20 See Garick, supra note 2, at 298.
21 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 0.1.
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three identifiable ways that market power can be exercised, which
were well summarized by Robert Pitofsky in 1992:
[M]ergers can provide a convenient route to monopoly as
firms buy out rivals and then raise prices to consumers.
Mergers are also a matter of concern because when only a
few firms account for all or most sales of a product, they
may be able to behave like monopolists and more easily
coordinate their sales policies to extract higher prices and
earn greater profits at the expense of consumers. Beyond
these specific concerns ... there is a generalized view that,
in noncompetitive markets, incentives to achieve
efficiency, to innovate and to drive down prices will
diminish.'
Monopoly creation, cartel facilitation, and generally lethargic
enterprise can be referred to as the three dangers of mergers. The
concerns regarding monopoly creation should not be narrowly
constricted, as the Merger Guidelines explain that
"[c]ircumstances ... may permit a single firm, not a monopolist,
to exercise market power through unilateral or non-coordinated
conduct."' Similarly, cartel facilitation may be understood also
to include problems of conscious parallelism and tacit collusion.
Finally, the term "lethargic enterprise" is used here to connote a
lack of dynamism, and to imply that firms will have diminished
incentives to initiate beneficial improvements, such as lowering
costs and developing new technologies.
Mergers pose the dangers of monopoly creation, cartel
facilitation, and lethargic enterprise, because the likelihood of
these problems rises, to varying degrees, with: (1) the market
share of the leading firm, and (2) overall market concentration. A
brief summary of current U.S. and EU practice in merger control
illustrates that EU law is more concerned with monopoly
creation and the complacency of a market-dominating firm,
' Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement
in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. Lj. 195, 195 (1992) (footnote omitted) (written
before the author was an FTC Commissioner) [hereinafter Pitofsky,
Proposals].
23 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, S 0.1.
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whereas U.S. merger review appears relatively more concerned
with cartel facilitation and market-wide lethargy.
U.S. law reflects, to an extent, all three of the above concerns
in Section Seven of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers
whose effects "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."24 The U.S. enforcement bodies
interpret this statute as requiring them to prevent mergers that
will create or facilitate the exercise of market power." The 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines define market power as "the ability
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a
significant period of time" or to lessen competition in product
26quality, service, or innovation. In deciding whether a horizontal
merger may have anti-competitive effects, U.S. merger law relies
to a large extent on market share statistics of the merging firms
and other leading firms in the industry.
Despite the statutory neutrality, scholars have asserted that,
empirically, "coordinated interaction is the principal [U.S.]
enforcement concern."2 Although the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines discuss the increased dangers of both coordination and
unilateral conduct, the previously issued 1984 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines concentrated extensively on the problem of collusion
and addressed only briefly the risk of anticompetitive effects from
unilateral activity.28 Among possible historical factors that could
have contributed to this focus is the fact that antitrust policy
began in the United States with the Sherman Act as a powerful
populist attack on the rise of the industrial trusts that had
permitted the industrialists of the late 1800s to coordinate their
prices and control their industries at the expense of consumers. 29
Although current U.S. law recognizes the danger that mergers can
lead to anti-competitive unilateral conduct, agency practice tends
24 15 U.S.C. §18 (1994).
5 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, 5 0.1.
26 Id. § 0.1 n.6.
27 BARRY E. HAWK & HENRY L. HUSER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
MERGER CONTROL: A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE 216 (1996).
28 See ABA ANITRUST SECTION, THE 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES: COMMENTARY AND TEXT 12-13 (1992) (indicating that the 1984
Guidelines mentioned unilateral conduct briefly under the discussion of the
"Leading Firm Proviso").
29 See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 936, 939-40 (1987).
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to indicate that collusion and coordination between competitors
persist as the stronger focus of merger regulation.
EU law, on its face, appears to have a comparably greater
focus on preventing anticompetitive conduct committed by the
leading firm of an industry. Article 2 of the EU Merger
Regulation, adopted in December 1989, declares a merger to be
incompatible with the common market if it "creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it."", Generally, the European
Commission follows the definition of "dominant position" as
derived from the principles established by the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") in connection with Article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome ("Article 86").31 This jurisprudence defines a dominant
position as "economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on
the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its
[immediate] customers, and ultimately of the consumers [of the
final product]."32
One commentator describes cartel-like behavior (or "multi-
firm dominance") under the EU Merger Regulation as the "'poor
cousin' to single firm dominance. 2P The European Court of
30 EU Merger Regulation, supra note 6, art. 2, § 3.
3' See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48-49; Joseph P. Griffin & Leeanne T. Sharp,
Efficiency Issues in Competition Analysis in Australia, the European Union, and
the United States, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 667 (1996) ("The Commission has
adopted for use in the Merger Regulation the definition of 'dominance'
formulated in relation to Article 86."). Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a
dominant position and is the analog of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in U.S.
antitrust law. See id. There is some debate as to whether it is appropriate to
directly transfer the ECJ's definitions from Article 86 to Article 2 of the
Merger Regulation. See, e.g., Alessandro Bertolini & Francesco Parisi, The Rise
of Structuralism in European Merger Control, 32 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 13, 24-26
(1996). One commentator explains that the Commission uses the definition
and language from its Article 86 jurisprudence, while applying the concept in a
novel manner. See Sergio Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and
European Union: How Should the United States' Experience Influence the
Enforcement of the Council Merger Regulation?, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
223, 272-74 (1997).
32 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979-2
E.C.R. 461, 462 (1979); see also Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 31, at 26
(explaining the ECJ's definition of a dominant position).
13 HAWK & HUSER, supra note 27, at 216.
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Justice has emphasized that dominant conduct is not comparable
to parallel oligopolist conduct.34 In theory, one could argue that
the Regulation arguably does not even address anticompetitive
problems arising out of a merger unless the merger involves, or
will create, a market leader. As one commentator notes:
One can argue that the substantive test ... means that you
cannot violate the Regulation unless the resulting
combined entity becomes number one in a market. There
has never been a case [as of 1990] where someone had a
dominant position unless they were number one. So,
unless you end up number one, you can't violate the
Regulation."
Scholars have confirmed that "[it] may thus be argued that the
preventive antitrust policy introduced by the Merger Regulation
is limited to mergers creating or reinforcing single-firm
dominance."36 Recent cases such as Nestle/Perrier7 illustrate that
the European Commission has begun to use the Merger
Regulation to prevent "collective dominance" in oligopolistic
markets,38 but the relative focus of EU law on single-firm
dominance remains.
It has been shown that the EU Merger Regulation is
concerned with the creation or strengthening of dominant
positions, while U.S. law focuses more generally on the structure
of the entire market. In other words, U.S. merger review law
focuses on insuring a market structure that will prevent
oligopolistic coordination and preserve competition to keep the
leading firm or firms in line, while EU merger law focuses on
" See Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 31, at 26 (citing Case 85/76, Hoffman-
La Roche, supra note 32).
" Barry E. Hawk, European Economic Community Merger Regulation, 59
ANTITRUST L. J. 457, 463 (1990).
36 Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 31, at 26.
"' Commission Decision 92/553, Re Proceeding Under Council
Re lation EEC No 4064/89, Case No. IV/M190-Nestle/Perrier, 1992 O.J. (L
3e-M [hereinafter Nestle/Perrier] (blocking a merger because of a findin
that, in the concentrated market, it would strengthen the ability of the merged
firm to exercise "collective dominance" with competitors).
38 See id at 1; see generally Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 31 (discussing in
depth this recent development in EU law).
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preventing the leading firm from strengthening and abusing its
position in the market through acquisitions. This difference is
clear in practice and is recognized by enforcement officials. As
one member of the FTC has recently stated, "it is fair to say that
the EC focuses more on single firm dominance and the United
States focuses more on oligopoly coordination."39 In terms of
preventing the three anticompetitive dangers noted above, the EU
law centers around the market leader, while U.S. law focuses on
the market more generally.
There are a number of philosophical rationales that may
animate an increased focus in the European Union on the leading
firm of an industry relative to the United States. First, U.S. law
has moved away from viewing the concentration of economic
power as an evil outside of the risk of economic deadweight losses
and reduced incentives to innovate.' Although U.S. antitrust law
originated with many populist ideas, it has subsequently evolved
to place significant emphasis on economic analysis. In particular,
U.S. law has become principally concerned with whether
particular behavior will, over the long run, lead to improvements
in allocative efficiency and/or increases in consumer welfare.4
Chairman Pitofsky has stated, for example, that "[iln the United
States [as compared to Europe], the emphasis is less on
competitors and 'competitive leverage,' and more on the effect of
a merger on future prices. "42
This focus on overall effects leaves much more room to
consider the beneficial welfare effects of mergers, which makes
larger and more dominant firms much more tolerable when these
firms will possess welfare-enhancing attributes, such as economies
of scale. Further, the influence of the so-called "Chicago School"
in U.S. law has resulted in various assumptions that migrate fears
of the concentration of monopoly power, suggesting that most
markets are indeed competitive, that "monopoly tends to be self-
" Debra A. Valentine, Building a Cooperative Framework for Oversight in
Mergers- The Answer to Extraterritorial Issues in Merger Review, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 525, 528 (1998).
40 SeeJebsen & Stevens, supra note 19, at 449, 454.
41 See id.
42 Robert Pitofsky, Address Before the Business Development Associates,
Staples and Boeing: What They Say About Merger Enforcement at the FTC (Sept.
23, 1997) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/STAPLESspc.htm>
[hereinafter Pitofsky, Staples Speech].
41 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 19, at 456.
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correcting because the monopolist's higher profits attract new
entrants.. .,"44 and that barriers to entry are usually not
influential in the long term." It has also be observed that, in
contrast to efficiencies that may be generated by dominant firms,
coordinated pricing has little, if any, welfare-enhancing effects.
EU law appears to operate from an economic premise more
hospitable to the likelihood of monopoly power being exerted by
the leading firm.46 An example can be seen in the area of
predatory pricing. Modern U.S. case law finds it extremely
unlikely that predatory pricing can and would occur-at least
successfully.' However, the ECJ finds the likelihood of this
practice occurring to be much greater, and, in the European
Union, a much broader range of behavior is prohibited. Unlike
in the United States, it is possible that pricing above cost would
still result in sanctions for predatory pricing if the pricing is
combined with "abusive intent."48 Similarly, the ECJ has stated
that "if prices are below average total costs ... but above average
variable costs, those prices must be regarded as abusive if they are
determined as part of a plan for eliminating a competitor."49
Non-economic considerations may also partly underlie the
EU's stronger concern with leading or "dominant" firms. The
EU merger analysis, although significantly driven by economics,
is more explicit in permitting the consideration of non-economic
factors."0 As the former EU Competition Commissioner Karel
Van Miert has stated:
The aims of European Community's competition policy
are economic, political and social. The policy is concerned
not only with promoting efficient production but also
44 See id.
" See id. (citing Fox & Sullivan, supra note 29, at 974).
46 It is possible that, because of the large area of the U.S. market in
comparison to European nations, collusion among many firms in the United
States has generally been more common historically than single firm
dominance.
47 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209 (1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
48 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 19, at 495.
49 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-755.
" See Barry E. Hawk, The American (Anti-trust) Revolution: Lessons for the
EEC?, 9 EuR. COMPETON L. REV. 53, 56-57 (1988).
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achieving the aims of the European treaties.... To this
must be added the need to safeguard a pluralistic
democracy, which could not survive a strong
concentration of economic power."'
One possible implication of the EU's apparent relative de-
emphasis of consumer welfare is that EU law may protect
competition at times even if it may be at the expense of
consumers- at least in the short run. For example, "when
considering factors in addition to market share, [EU merger-
review authorities] are likely to find damning those qualities, such
as excellent technology or customer service, that generally would
win praise in American courts." 2 This will be discussed later in
the context of the efficiencies generated by the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger. 3
Thus, EU Merger law, as compared to U.S. law, focuses more
on the leading firm and less on the possibility of explicit or tacit
collusion between competitors. As stated above, this leads EU
authorities to analyze the merger in terms of monopoly-creation
and leading firm lethargy, while U.S. regulators have a relatively
greater focus on cartel facilitation and general market
responsiveness to consumer interests. These differences will be
illustrated further in the context of the Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas merger.
1.3. The Commercial Aircraft Market and the Events Leading
up to the Merger
As The Economist has reported, "[a]ny account of the civil-
aircraft industry must begin with the caveat that it has never had
free and fair competition." 4 The defense and commercial aircraft
sectors, in addition to being inter-dependent, are considered to be
two of the most politicized industries in the global economy
today.5  For example, in the years preceding the
51 Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 19, at 450 (quoting EU Competition
Commissioner Karel Van Miert).
52 Id. at 479.
s See discussion infra Section 2.3.
4 Peace in Our Time: Boeing v. Airbus, THE ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at
59.
55 See id.
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Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger (the 'Merger"), President
Clinton intervened in order to win sales for Boeing and the
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation ("IDC") in Saudi Arabia,56
China,"7 and Israel. 8 Airbus Industrie ("Airbus") was created by
Western European governments that were concerned that Boeing,
MDC, and Lockheed (active in the commercial market until 1981)
would wipe out their weak and divided industry. 9 Airbus was
founded in 1970 and developed into a "consortium" of four
independent companies that together build commercial aircraft.6"
These four European companies were, at the time of the
Boeing/MDC merger, France's Aerospatiale SA with 37.9%,
Germany's Daimler-Benz Aerospace AG with 37.9%, British
Aerospace PLC with 20%, and Spain's Construcciones
Aeronauticas S.A. ("CASA") with 4.2%.6i
The United States' anger at European subsidies to Airbus
resulted in a 1978 U.S. threat to impose anti-dumping duties on
Airbus planes ordered by Eastern Airlines.62  No duties were
assessed, but by the 1980's, there were increasing complaints from
Boeing about the $10 billion to date in European subsidies.63
Although the dispute was very visible, Boeing hesitated to take
any action that could result in an altercation and its exclusion
from the European market. Finally, a bilateral deal was signed in
56 See id.
" See Robert S. Greenberger & Ian Johnson, U.S.-China Summit Brings in
Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997, at A18. The Asian market has been
particularly sensitive to political considerations, as more recent political
maneuvering demonstrates. See Paul Blustein, U.S. Pressing Taiwan on Boeing s
Behalf, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1999, at E9 (reporting U.S. diplomacy in reaction
to Taiwanese suggestions that its flagship airline might purchase planes from
Airbus and that Boeing maintains an edge in the Japanese market because of
the close relationship between the United States and Japan).
" See Polly Lane, Jet Sales Now as Much a Diplomatic Tool as Economic,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 4, 1998, at Fl.
'9 See Peace in Our Time: Boeing v. A irbus, supra note 54, at 59.
60 See Commercial Battle Goes On as Airbus Reaches 25, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 27, 1997.
61 See Charles Goldsmith, Aerospatiale to Form Unit for Its Airbus Activities,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 14, 1998, at 7. These four partners have undergone
major changes subsequent to the Boeing/MDC merger. See infra, notes 371-74
and accompanying text.
62 See Peace in Our Time: Boeing v. A irbus, supra note 54, at 61.
63 See id.
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1992, which limited subsidies to 33% of the cost of developing a
new model of aircraft. 64
Problems persisted, however, especially with regard to the
"jumbo jet" market. Boeing's 747 is currently the only available
jet of its size and earns extraordinary profits; for example, it has
been reported that in 1997 Boeing made a net profit of nearly $45
million out of the purchase price of $150 million.6 After
discussions between Boeing and Airbus concerning a possible
joint venture to create a new jet collapsed in 1995, the chief
executive of Airbus stated his belief that the entire affair was a
ruse to delay Airbus' development of its own proposed "A3XX"
double-decker jumbo- which would supposedly be 20% cheaper
to build than the 747.66 By this time, there were only three
remaining major players in the commercial aircraft market
(Boeing, Airbus, and Douglas Aircraft Corp. ('DAC"), which is
MDC's commercial aircraft unit) and DAC's significance in the
market was fading.
Meanwhile, in the interrelated U.S. defense industry, a
devastating drop in money for defense procurement led to vast
industry over capacity. When adjusted for inflation, it has been
reported that defense spending dropped 71% and that companies
were operating in some areas at 20-30% capacity by 1996.6' The
industry responded with rapid consolidation; it has been
estimated that more than 300 defense-related mergers and
acquisitions occurred between 1980 and 1995.68 The U.S.
Department of Defense supported this consolidation, especially
because the cost-based nature of defense contracts results in the
U.S. government directly paying for the excess capacity.69
Among the mergers that directly preceded the Boeing/MDC deal
were the $23 billion mega-merger of Lockheed with Martin
Marietta that created Lockheed-Martin," the $2.3 billion merger
64 See id.
65 See id. at 62.
66 See id.
67 See Marina Lao, Mergers in a Declining Defense Industry: Should the
Merger Guidelines Be Re-Assessed?, 28 CONN. L. REV. 347, 351 (1996).
68 See id. at 391 n.88 (citing Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Antitrust Aspects of Defense, 66 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) Special Supp. at S10, Apr. 14, 1994).
69 See Lao, supra note 67, at 363.
70 See Richard M. Weintraub & Sharon Walsh, Toward a More Perfect
Union: With the Lockheed-Martin Marietta Match Come Antitrust, Competition
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of Raytheon and E-Systems," and Boeing's previous acquisition
on December 6, 1996 of $3.2 billion worth of Rockwell's defense
and space business.'
Boeing and MDC announced their proposed merger on
December 15, 1996 in this context. McDonnell-Douglas'
prospects had been getting dimmer, and its desire for a merger
was becoming stronger, ever since it was eliminated, in favor of
Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, from the high stakes competition
for a $200 billion contract to build the Pentagon's new Joint
Strike Fighter- a devastating loss that sent MDC shares down 8%
in a single day.73 Two advantages of the merger that were
frequently cited by the media involved its creation of a "better
balance" between defense and commercial aircrafts due to the two
firms' complementary product lines, and involved the ability of
Boeing to use MDC's capacity and work force to help meet its
current order backlog and the expected imminent surge in
demand for commercial aircraft. 4 Analysts noted that this
balance between commercial aircraft, defense, and space "should
smooth out the [demand] swings and reduce future volatility."' It
was also noted that Boeing could use commercial "offsets" to
bolster its international sales of military hardware.76
Soon after the merger announcement, complaints began to be
heard from Airbus. In February 1997, the chairman of Daimler-
Questions, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1994, at Fl; see also Mark Shwartz, Note,
e Not-So-New Antitrust Environment for Consolidation in the Defense Industry:
The Martin Marietta-Lockheed Merger, 1996 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 329, 331
(1996) (discussing Lockheed-Martin and E-systems/Raytheon mergers).
7' See John Mintz, Raytheon to Acquire E-Systems, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
1995, at D1.
72 See Rockwell International Corp.: Shareholders Approve Sale ofBusinesses to
Boeing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1996. This merger wave was abruptly halted in
1998 when Lockheed-Martin's attempt to acquire Northrop Grumman was
blocked by the Department of Justice. See Lockheed Terminates Northrop
Merger, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at A3.
7 See John Mintz, From King of the Skies to Subcontractor: Douglas Aircrafts
Deal With Longtime Rival Boeing Signals Depth of Pioneer's Troubles, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 1996, at Hi1; John Mintz, McDonnell Douglas May Become Boeing
Supplier, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1996, at C1.
' See Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., U.S. Industry Poised for Further Realignment,
AVIATION WK. AND SPACE TECH., Dec. 23, 1996, at 10 (1996); Enter McBoeing,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 89.
's Michele Kayal, Boeing Purchase Gets U.S. Blessing: Merger Faces Tougher
Test with EU Officials in the Wings., J. COMM., July 2, 1997, at 4.
76 See id.
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Benz Aerospace (an Airbus partner) complained that a Northrop
Gunman ("Northrop") major aircraft/defense company had
decided not to participate as a risk-sharer in the Airbus A3XX
program because of pressure from Boeing and MDC on their U.S.
suppliers, including Northrop.' Airbus' anger and EU
opposition to the merger became more pronounced after three
exclusive supply arrangements were signed by Boeing with major
U.S. airlines between November 1996 and June 1997. 7
The FTC took U.S. antitrust authority for reviewing the
Boeing/MDC merger.7 ' After a lengthy investigation, the FTC
decided not to challenge the merger and published a brief
explanatory letter on July 1, 1997.80 In Europe, the Boeing/MDC
merger met the threshold criteria, subjecting it to European
Commission jurisdiction, and DG IV undertook an extensive
investigation.8 On July 4, 1997, a fifteen member advisory panel,
' See Pierre Sparaco, High Capacity Transport Critical to Airbus Plan,
AVIATION WK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 24, 1997, at 32.
78 See Pierre Sparaco, Airbus Fights Back in U.S.-Europe Rivalry, AVIATION
WK & SPACE TECH., June 23, 1997, at 20; see also infra Section 2.4.
7' The FTC and DOJ have adopted "Clearance Procedures" that they use
in order to decide which agency will be responsible for reviewing a merger.
See James F. Rill, Antitrust Enforcement: Department of Justice, FTC, State
Attorneys General and Private Parties, in 35TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW
INSTITUTE, 909, 967-68 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B-846, 1994). Usually, the agencies attempt to make this decision within
ten days of the merger being filed with the agencies. The key issue in the
decision is which agency has the most expertise in the product area involved,
presumably having been gained through a substantial recent antitrust
investigation in the industry. Ongoing agency contacts with the involved
parties due to another investigation are also considered relevant. See id. It has
been reported that an extensive political battle over who would review the
Boeing/MDC merger preceded the decision to award authority to the FTC.
See Federal Regulators Compete On Mergers, FTC Takes Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas Deal, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 8, 1997, at B8. It is
perhaps not surprising that the FTC won this battle given that the FTC had
been handling Boeing's previously announced combination with Rockwell's
defense businesses. See, e.g., Polly Lane, Politicians Favor Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas Deal- Antitrust Concerns Are Largest Obstacle to Approval of Proposed
Acquisition, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at Al.
8 See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet
D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Stark Ill, and Christine A Varney, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH), 24, 295, at 24, 123 (July 1, 1997) [hereinafter FTC Majority's July 1
Statement].
81 See Commission Decision IV/M.877 of 30 July 1997, Declaring a
Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of
the EEA Agreement, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 2 [hereinafter EU Commission's
Boeing Decision].
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consisting of the chiefs of member states' antitrust enforcement
agencies, unanimously recommended that the European
Commission block the merger- a stance for which Van Miert,
who had repeatedly expressed his opposition to the proposed
merger, quickly attained Commission support. 2 A heated war of
words followed, during which President Clinton threatened trade
sanctions against the European Union in the event that the
merger was blocked. 3 Tension was extremely high, and as late as
one day before the Commission's scheduled meeting of July 23,
1997, Van Miert claimed that the Commission would block the
merger.84  Finally, after Boeing made various last minute
concessions, a settlement was reached, and the Commission
agreed to approve the merger at its July 23 meeting, subject to the
"undertakings" to which Boeing had agreed."
2. THREE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT
A number of interesting and unresolved antitrust issues were
placed squarely at the forefront by the Boeing/MDC merger.
The merger unquestionably strengthened Boeing's position in the
commercial aircraft market, but U.S. authorities were more
concerned with the inability of McDonnell-Douglas' commercial
aircraft unit to compete effectively in the future and have any
impact on prices.8 6 This general difference in focus resulted from
a few contrasting philosophies and economic assumptions
embodied in U.S. and EU law, which included the following: (i)
U.S. law expresses a greater concern for the likelihood of
oligopolist pricing in a concentrated market than does EU law;
(ii) U.S. law places more emphasis on improving consumer and
social welfare, whereas EU law allows for the consideration of
certain non-economic interests that are harmed by significant
economic concentrations; (iii) EU law assumes a higher likelihood
8See Anne Swardson, EU Panel Urges Rejection of Boeing-McDonnell
Merger, WASH. POST, July 5, 1997, at F9; Julie Wolf, Boeing-McDonnell Merger
Plan Is Closer to Rejection in Europe, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1997, at B4.
83 See Brian Coleman, Clinton Hints U.S. May Retaliate if EU Tries to Block
Boeing-McDonnell Deal, WALL. ST. J., July 18, 1997, at A2.
14 See Peace in Our Time: Boeing v. Airbus, supra note 54, at 59.
85 See id.
86 See supra Section 1.2. As discussed previously, this generality regarding
U.S. and EU competition law is now generally accepted by scholarly
commentators and members of the FTC. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 1.
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of a market leader achieving and exerting significant market
power than does U.S. law; and (iv) U.S. law finds it much more
probable than EU law that merger-created efficiency gains in the
market leader will increase overall consumer (and/or societal)
wealth. These differences, among others, resulted in each
enforcement body analyzing various aspects of the Boeing/MDC
merger very differently.
These contrasting philosophies and assumptions led to at least
three major areas where the U.S. and EU law had contrasting
views of the same aspects of the proposed Boeing/MDC merger:
(1) the "competitive potential" of MDC and the likely exit of
DAC absent the merger; (2) the significance of the enormous
efficiencies that were expected to be generated by the merger; and
(3) the importance and relevance of the exclusive supply contracts
previously entered into by Boeing and three major U.S. airlines.
First, U.S. authorities, placing great emphasis on MDC's pre-
merger inability to compete, found little relevant difference
between MDC leaving the commercial aircraft market or being
joined with Boeing- the number of competitors would still be
reduced to two. The European Union, however, found more
relevance in the extent to which, post-merger, MDC's competitive
potential could significantly contribute to Boeing's, enabling it to
enhance its market dominance. Second, whereas U.S. law would
view positively any efficiencies created by a merger which could
result in lower prices for consumers (and rationalize resource
allocation in the commercial aircraft and defense industries), the
European Union viewed these cost-savings as enabling Boeing to
strengthen its dominance in a market increasingly characterized
by imperfect competition. Furthermore, the European Union
doubted that any cost savings would benefit consumers in the
long run. Third, whereas the United States found the exclusive
dealing arrangements to be only slightly troubling, and unrelated
to the analysis of the effect of the merger on overall market
structure, the EU feared that these arrangements, especially when
combined with the merger, would greatly contribute to Boeing's
ability to maintain and strengthen its dominant position in the
commercial aircraft market. This article will discuss each of these
three areas in depth after an initial summary of the concerns
raised by the Boeing/MDC merger at the most basic level.
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2.1. The Prima Facie Case Against the Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas Merger
The most basic level of merger analysis is a simple estimate of
the merging firms' market shares and overall market
concentration. Much has been written in the United States on
what level of market share or market concentration is too high,
and enforcement policies over time have varied." One
particularly well known U.S. standard was announced in the
Alcoa case, which states: to constitute monopoly under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, over 90% market share is "enough," 33%
"certainly... is not," and "sixty to sixty-four percent "is
"doubtful."88 Of course, merger law acts to prevent monopoly
formation in its earlier stages and thus might be expected to
frown upon mergers creating even significantly smaller shares.
Because of the generally high market concentration in the
commercial aircraft market, and the very high market share of
Boeing in particular, a deep analysis of this issue is unnecessary
for the purposes of this article. The Boeing/MDC merger would
be expected to raise antitrust concerns under virtually any
standard. However, a brief summary of the modern decision-
making processes of the enforcement bodies will suffice to give a
general understanding of current U.S. procedure for challenging
horizontal mergers and how it compares with the European
standard.
Pursuant to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the U.S.
enforcement bodies use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI")
to assess the concentration in the market.89 The 1HI- takes the
squares of the firms' market shares and adds them together,
effectively giving higher weight to the larger market shares. The
intent is to have the index reflect the leading roles that very large
firms play in an exercise of market power.' The Guidelines
divide postmerger HHI market concentration figures into three
categories: unconcentrated (less than 1000 HH1M, moderately
concentrated (between 1000 and 1800 HI), and highly
8 See Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 200-05 (briefly summarizing the
debate).
88 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945).
89 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, 5 1.5.
0 See Garick, supra note 2, at 317.
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concentrated (over 1800 HM .9i In unconcentrated markets, the
enforcement bodies are unlikely to challenge the merger.92 In
moderately or highly concentrated markets, the enforcement
bodies will engage in a second calculation in order to determine
the amount by which the merger raises the HHI.93 An increase of
more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated market, or an
increase of more than 50 points in a highly concentrated market,
will lead the enforcement bodies to consider the merger as raising
serious anti-competitive concerns. 4
In cases with very high market shares, even tiny mergers can
lead the enforcement bodies to challenge the merger. For
example, if one firm has a market share of 60%, this already raises
the HHI to at least 3600. Adding a single percentage point to the
60% will result in an increase of 121 points.9 In fact, in a highly
concentrated market, the HI-1 test indicates that adding a 1%
market share to any market share over 25% will exceed the fifty
point threshold. However, even post-merger market shares of up
to 42%96 can theoretically avoid challenges under certain
conditions.
Under EU law, a precondition to merger-enforcement is the
finding of a "dominant position" on the part of a merging
company, or the likelihood of such a company being created by
the merger. Exactly what levels of market share constitute a
dominant position may vary, but they appear to be significantly
lower than the corresponding levels that would give rise to
concern in the United States. One recent Article 86 case found a
50% market share to be prima facie evidence of dominance.' In a
1993 merger case involving Du Pont and Imperial Chemical
Industries (I0"), the Commission alleged dominance in product
91 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 1.5.
91See id. § 1.51.
91 See id.
94 See id.
15 61 squared is 3721.
96 42 squared is' 1764, which is still below 1800.
17 See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-
3359, 1-3360. But some commentators have characterized this case as a
significant departure from prior case law. See, e.g., Jonathan Smith, Abuse of
Dominant Position: Predatory Pricing: AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 12
EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 205, 208-09 (1991).
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markets where the combined market share was 43%.98 However,
most cases in which the European Commission has challenged a
merger involved market shares "significantly higher than 43%. ,,99
Indeed, the preamble of the Merger Regulation sets forth a
presumption that a merger is compatible with the common
market, and thus permissible, when the combined market share of
the merged firms is less than 25%.'00
Some commentators, in the context of comparing U.S.
enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to EU enforcement
of Article 86, believe that "[t]he difference is that EU authorities
satisfy themselves that dominance exists on the basis of market
shares that tend to be lower."1 If evidence from Article 86 cases
are any guide, the European Union tends to draw "comparatively
narrow markets and assert the existence of monopoly power
within such markets on the basis of market shares or other indicia
of power" that could escape such a classification by U.S.
authorities. 2 Some commentators, however, have noted slightly
more reluctance to declare a dominant position in cases under the
Merger Regulation, where the consequences are often automatic,
as compared to Article 86, where a subsequent abuse needs to be
shown before legal action is taken. 3
A prima facie case that proves that the Boeing/MDC merger
raises serious anti-competitive issues is clear under virtually any
standard. In an analysis based purely on the current market share,
the Boeing/MDC merger easily qualifies as prima facie
anticompetitive under the applicable U.S. and EU tests.
Chairman Pitofsky stated:
[a]s many have noted, the proposed merger on its face did
appear to raise serious antitrust concerns in connection
with the commercial aircraft sector because Boeing
accounts for roughly 60% of the sales of large commercial
" See Commission Decision TV/M214 of 30 September 1992, Declaring
the Compatibility of a Concentration with the Common Market, 93/9/EEC,
1993 O.J. (L 7) 13, 20, 32.
9 Opi, supra note 31, at 274.
" See EU Merger Regulation, supra note 6, at 15.
101 Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 19, at 479.
102 Id. at 462.
103 See, e.g., Opi, supra note 31, at 274.
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aircraft and McDonnell Douglas, while its market share
was slightly below 5% was a non-failing direct
competitor." 4
The FTC's July 1 statement itself admitted that "[o]n its face,
the proposed merger appears to raise serious antitrust
concerns." 5 The European Commission agreed." 6
2.2. The Strength (or Weakness) ofMcDonnell-Douglas"
Commercial Aircraft Business
2.2.1. Background U.S. Law
U.S. law recognizes that a prima facie case based on market
structure and current market shares may be misleading if
particular factors about the market and/or the acquired firm are
true. One common example, although not applicable to the
Boeing/MDC merger, is that of ease of market entry- i.e., that
there is likely to be significant market entry that will quickly
challenge the market share of the newly-merged firm. l"' Another
example where current market share data needs to be modified to
reflect market realities, which is very relevant to the
Boeing/MDC merger, is where the current market share of one
firm (often the acquired firm) over-represents that firm's future
competitive significance. This idea is embodied in at least two
separate doctrines in merger analysis: the General Dynamics
doctrine and the "failing company" defense.
In 1974, in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,""8 the
Supreme Court stated that the statistical data about the market
and market shares relied upon by the government were "not
conclusive indicators of anticompetitive effects .... [O]nly a
further examination of the particular market-its structure,
history, and probable future- can provide the appropriate setting
Pitofsky, Staples Speech, supra note 42.
105 FTC Majority's July 1 Statement, supra note 80.
106 See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 37, at 21.
107 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, S 3.11. The
commercial aircraft market is generally considered to have extremely high
barriers to entry.
"' United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
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for judging the probably anti-competitive effect of the merger."" 9
The message was that the traditional methods of measuring the
likely anti-competitive effects of a merger- the same ones that are
used today- ignore some factors which, when relevant, can cause
the prima facie analysis to significantly overestimate or
underestimate the anti-competitive risk of a merger. In the
General Dynamics case itself, for instance, the Court looked at the
ability of the acquired firm to acquire further coal reserves, which
it viewed as more accurately reflecting the future competitive
potential of the merging parties than did current market shares."
The so-called General Dynamics doctrine has become widely
accepted in U.S. law, and current judicial opinions continue to
invoke it."' In a 1991 case, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the
current understanding of the doctrine:
[A] defendant may rebut the government's prima facie case
by showing that the government's market share statistics
overstate the acquired firm's ability to compete in the
future and that, discounting the acquired firm's market
share to take this into account, the merger would not
substantially lessen competition. The weakness of the
acquired firm is only relevant if the defendant
demonstrates that this weakness undermines the predictive
value of the government's market share statistics.112
The extent to which this doctrine can be used is illustrated by
another recent decision, which cited General Dynamics in
approving a merger between manufacturers which created a firm
with a market share of 76% in an already highly concentrated
market.'
109 Id. at 498 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322
n. 38 (1962)).
..0 See id. at 502-03 (finding that the acquired firm's current market share
significantly overestimated its competitive significance).
III See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1304 (9th Cir. 1993); R.C.
Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1989).
' FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F. 2d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 1991);
4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 935b, at 140-
41 (1980).
"' See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 n. 3, 986
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (opinion written by Clarence Thomas and joined by Ruth
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The antitrust enforcement bodies have recognized the General
Dynamics doctrine in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, stating
that "recent or ongoing changes in the market may indicate that
the current market share of a particular firm either understates or
overstates the firm's future competitive significance."' 4 In sum, it
appears that there is substantial room for a defendant in a merger
case to cite factors with respect to the market or the acquired firm
that illustrate that the merger will not have the negative effects
contemplated by the Clayton Act.
A more absolute defense to merger enforcement under U.S.
law, although extremely difficult to prove, is the failing firm
defense. This defense is derived from the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions of International Shoe"5. and Citizen Publishing Co."6
These cases required that a firm demonstrate three facts in order
to successfully invoke the defense: (1) that the firm is in imminent
danger of financial failure, (2) that the allegedly failing firm would
be unable to reorganize under the bankruptcy laws, and (3) that a
good faith attempt to sell the firm to an alternative buyer was
made, but was unsuccessful.
1 17
The U.S. antitrust enforcement bodies have also adopted this
doctrine. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that a
merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power or facilitate
exercise thereof, if "[imminent failure] of one of the merging firms
would cause the assets of that firm to exit the relevant market. In
such circumstances, post-merger performance in the relevant
market may be no worse than market performance had the
merger been blocked and the assets left the market."1'8
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have four strict
requirements necessary to successfully invoke the defense which
include the three criteria mentioned in International Shoe and
Bader Ginsburg- both now U.S. Supreme Court Justices). The market in this
case had an HHI of 4303, far above the 1800 considered "highly concentrated"
by the Merger Guidelines. See id. at 983 n.3.
114 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 1.521.
"1 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
116 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
117 See International Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302-03; Citizen Publishing Co., 394
U.S. at 138.
... Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, 5 5.0.
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Citizen Publishing and, absent the acquisition, the assets of the
failing firm would exit the relevant market." 9
The purpose of the failing firm defense has been the subject of
some debate. Some claim that the defense is at least partially
intended to protect the "private interests" in the failing firm,
"because of concern that shareholders, creditors, and communities
not suffer unnecessary injury.""' Supporters of this rationale
would be able to invoke the defense without coming to the
conclusion that the acquisition was not anticompetitive. Support
for this view generally comes from the language of the older
judicial opinions."2  A second rationale for the "failing firm"
defense, more akin to the General Dynamics doctrine, holds that
when a firm is failing financially and will not compete in the
future, its acquisition by a competitor will not substantially lessen
competition any more than the firm's failure would have."
Supporters of this rationale are presumably focusing on cartel-
facilitation and market-wide responsiveness to consumer interests,
both of which are very dependent on the number of competitors
in the market (which remains unaffected by the acquisition of a
failing competitor). It is clear, however, that the acquisition of a
failing competitor can, in many instances, contribute to
monopoly-creation and the strengthening of the market position
of the acquiring firm.1" Still, the 1992 Merger Guidelines focus
on the second economic rationale. 24
119 See id., supra note 10, § 5.1.
120 Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 231 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA &
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978) (noting that the legislative
history of the Clayton Act recognizes the interests of shareholders and other
private interests in merging firms).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 n.
46 (1963) (stating, "[t]hus, arguably, the so-called failing-company defense ...
might have somewhat larger contours as applied to bank mergers because of
the greater public impact of a bank failure compared with ordinary business
failures.").
122 See, e.g., Troy Paredes, Note, Turning the Failing Firm Defense Into a
Success: A Proposal to Revise the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 13 YALE J. ON
REG. 347, 362 (1996) (describing this view as the "economic rationale" view).
1 Pitofsky himself concedes the point in his 1992 article. See Pitofsky,
Proposals, supra note 22, at 231; infra text accompanying notes 352-53; see also
infra text accompanying notes 180-202 (discussing how the acquisition of
MDC could contribute to Boeing's dominance of the commercial aircraft
market).
124 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 5.
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2.2.2. Background EU Law
EU merger law leaves less room than United States law for the
possibility that current market share will overstate actual market
power. The case of Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland125 illustrates
the Commission's preference for current market share as a
measure of future ability to compete that is not as easy to
manipulate. In that case, the Commission was reviewing a
proposed acquisition of de Havilland, a Canadian subsidiary of
Boeing, by ATR, a joint-venture aircraft company comprised of
commuter aircraft manufacturers from France and Italy."' The
parties proposing the merger attempted to convince the
Commission to include options for future purchases in its market
share analysis."' At issue was the reliability of the options for
indicating future purchases. The technical performance of the
planes in the marketplace was usually the driving factor in the
successful conversion of options into firm orders. Although
much historical data was available, the Commission concluded
that the market and applicable technology was changing too
quickly for an adequate estimate of the importance of option, and
relied instead on market share figures based on firm orders to
date."2  The de Havilland case may demonstrate that the
European Commission has been less flexible than the U.S.
authorities in relying on softer variables to re-characterize market
share. Nevertheless, the Commission was willing to entertain this
argument at some length, which could demonstrate receptability
to the argument.
Market share data that results in a finding of a "dominant
position" does not end the legal inquiry. Although the text of the
European Merger Regulation disallows a merger that "creates or
strengthens a dominant position," this is followed by the phrase
"as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market."29 The Commission has used
this "significant impediment" test to add some flexibility in the
merger analysis and to determine whether this strengthening of a
125 See de Havilland, supra note 19, at 1991 OJ. (L 334) 42, 4 C.M.L.R. M2.
126 See id.; Griffin & Sharp, supra note 31, at 669.
127 See Garick, supra note 2, at 312.
12 See id. at 312, 313.
129 EU Merger Regulation, supra note 6, at 17.
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dominant position actually will have an impact upon the relevant
markets.13
In de Havilland, where the Commission held its first real
discussion of the "significant impediment" test, the Commission
stated that the relevant factors would primarily be: (1) the
potential for quick, new market entry by competitors; (2) the
ability of the proposed merger to contribute to technical and
economic progress; and (3) the potential market disturbances
caused by the merger.13 ' The first requirement partly mirrors a
similar consideration under U.S. law, permitting the creation of
large market shares that will likely be eroded by subsequent
entry, thereby eliminating the negative structural effects of the
merger. 13 2  A demonstration of low barriers to entry and/or
imminent entry can therefore avoid a Commission decision to
block a merger. One case, citing ease of entry, permitted a
merger creating a market share of over 90%.133
The other two factors of the significant impediment test, as
identified by the Commission in de Havilland, were much less
influential. The Commission used an extraordinarily limited
definition of the "technical and economic progress" factor,
limiting it to the consideration of possible cost savings- which
the Commission found to be insignificant." Further limiting the
importance of even cost considerations, the Commission found it
important that any cost savings were unlikely to be passed on to
consumers in the long run.1 31 With respect to the third
requirement, that "[a] certain amount of market disturbance needs
to be foreseen before a concentration creating or strengthening a
dominant position becomes incompatible under article 2(3), '36
131 See Timothy J. Dorsey, The European Community Merger Regulation:
Questions Answered, Uncertainties Remain, 8 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 95, 111
(1993).
13 See id. at 135-38 (discussing the "significant impediment" test laid forth
by the commission in de Havilland, supra note 19).
132 See de Havilland, supra note 19, 1991 O.J. (L334) at 56, 4 C.M.L.R. at
M27 ("[I]f there exists strong evidence that this position is only temporary and
would be quickly eroded.., with such market entry the dominant position is
not likely to significantly impede effective competition. ").
133 See Commission Decision, 91/535, Declaring the Compatibility With
the Common Market of a Concentration, Case No. 1V/M068-Tetra Pak/Alfa-
Laval, 1991 Oj. (L 290) 35; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 2203.
134 See infra Section 2.3. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 230-37.
1 See Dorsey, supra note 130, at 137 (citing de Havilland, supra note 19).
136 Id. at 111-12.
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the Commission demonstrated the difficulty facing a merging
company that has been found to possess a dominant position.
The Commission found a mere hypothetical possibility that a
price war could ensue and drive the merged company's rivals out
of the market, to be sufficient evidence of a market disturbance so
as to require a finding that competition would be significantly
impeded by the merger.'37
The analysis in de Havilland suggests that the "significant
impediment" test has not yet been given much substantive bite.3 '
Sir Leon Brittan, Van Miert's predecessor as Competition
Minister, further supported this view when he stated, '"You may
ask whether a dominant position without the effect of impeding
competition is at all conceivable. I think that in most cases it is
not." 139
The existence of a meaningful "failing firm" defense in EU
merger law is open to question. The Merger Regulation itself
does not address the issue,"4 and the argument has come up in
only two cases of which the author is aware.141 In
Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand,4 the Commission relied on a "failing
firm" rationale to approve the merger of the only two German
potash producers, which left a monopoly in the German market
and only two significant producers in all of Western Europe.
14 3
The Commission required a showing that: (1) the acquired firm
would soon exit the market; (2) there was no less anti-competitive
purchaser; and (3) the acquiring firm would have taken over the
market share of the acquired firm even absent the merger." This is
the only case where the defense was raised successfully.
The second EU case involving "failing firm" considerations
was de Havilland, and involved an attempt to raise a "failing
division" defense. The permissibility of using this defense was
"I See id. at 137 (citing the de Havilland decision, supra note 19).
138 See id.
139 Id. at 112 (citing SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND
MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 36-37 (1991)).
140 See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 27, at 269.
141 See id. (stating information as of 1996).
142 Commission Decision, Case No. IV.M308, Kali &
Salz/Mak/Treuhand, 1994 Oj. (L186) 38.
143 See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 27, at 269.
144 See id. at 269. This third requirement seems extraordinarily difficult to
satisfy.
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not, and has still not been, reached by the Commission. 4 In de
Havilland, the parties attempted to argue that, absent the merger,
Boeing (the de Havilland division's parent) would merely phase
out the de Havilland division and it would be eliminated as a
competitor.146 The Commission responded merely that "without
prejudice as to whether such a consideration is relevant pursuant to
Article 2 of the Merger Regulation, the Commission considers
that such elimination is not probable."4 In that case, the issue
was easy to avoid, since there was some reason to doubt that de
Havilland truly would have been phased out; in fact, there was a
possibility that another competitor, British Aerospace, would be
interested in purchasing the de Havilland division.'48
2.2.3. U.S. and EU Law Applied to the Boeing/MDC Merger
The relevant market shares attributed to Boeing, MDC, and
Airbus by the FTC were not made clear by the FTC's statement.
The FTC concluded that Boeing accounted for "roughly 60% of
the market." '49 The FTC did not provide a market share for
McDonnell Douglas, but the statement of dissenting
Commissioner Azcuenaga notes that MDC obtained 4% of the
total orders in the relevant market for 1996.15 Similarly,
Chairman Pitofsky has stated publicly that he viewed the market
share of MDC at just below 5%."'5 An HHI analysis based on
these market shares reveals that the merger raised the market's
HHI from 4912 to 5392, an increase of 480 points in an extremely
concentrated market.152 The Commissioners agreed that "[o]n its
face, the proposed merger appears to raise serious antitrust
concerns."' s However, the FTC did not choose to challenge the
145 See id. at 270.
146 See Garick, supra note 2, at 319.
147 Id. (emphasis added).
148 See id. at 320.
149 FTC Majority's July 1 Statement, supra note 80.
15' See Commissioner Mary Azcuenega, Statement in The Boeing Company,
File No. 971-0051 (available in http://www.ftc.gov /opa/1997/9707/ma.htm)
[hereinafter Statement of Commissioner Azcuenega].
151 See Pitofsky, Staples Speech, supra note 42.
152 Pre-merger market shares of 60, 36, and 4 result in an HHI of
3600+1296+16=4912. Post-merger market shares of 64 and 36 result in an
HI of 4096+1296=5392.
153 FTC Majority's July 1 Statement, supra note 80.
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merger, citing two reasons: "(1) McDonnell Douglas, looking
into the future, no longer constitutes a meaningful competitive
force in the commercial aircraft market[,] and (2) there is no
economically plausible strategy that McDonnell Douglas could
follow, either as a stand-alone concern or as part of another
concern, that would change that grim prospect.",,4 The reasoning
cited by the FTC combines aspects of both the General Dynamics
doctrine and the failing firm defense.
Although the majority did not cite the case by name,
Commissioner Azcuenega asserted in her statement that the
majority Commissioners relied "in their statement on the so-
called General Dynamics defense, that is, that market shares based
on past performance may overstate a firm's future competitive
significance." 5' Furthermore, Chairman Pitofsky, in discussing
the Boeing case, has cited the "teachings of General Dynamics-
that future market potential is a critical factor rather than past
market shares" as a basis for the FTC's decision."5 '
It takes persuasive evidence indeed to conclude that, despite
the fact that McDonnell-Douglas was still receiving orders in
1996, and despite the fact that it was one of only three players in
the market, DAC could exert no meaningful competitive force.
However, the FTC believed that it did have some very powerful
and persuasive evidence. It claimed that, after interviewing over
forty airlines, "including almost every U.S. carrier, large and
small, and many foreign carriers," the "virtually unanimous"
testimony was that DAC was no longer a competitive force in the
market for commercial aircraft, and that the "vast majority of
airlines will no longer consider purchasing" aircraft from MDC"'
The FTC elaborated that MDC's deteriorating position in the
commercial aircraft market was due to its inability to invest in
product lines, infrastructure, and research and development at
rates comparable to Boeing and Airbus. The FTC also noted that
MDC's product line did not offer common features which could
create efficiencies for airlines by allowing interchangeability of
spare parts and pilot training."5
154 Id.
155 Statement of Commissioner Azcuenega, supra note 150.
156 Pitofsky, Staples Speech, supra note 42.
157 FTC Majority's July 1 Statement, supra note 80.
158 See id.
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The FTC's conclusion that DAC had no further ability to
compete, and that there was no economically plausible strategy
that DAC could follow in order to turn around the company, is
reminiscent of a failing firm argument." 9  The FTC
Commissioners, perhaps sensitive to this fact, explicitly stated
that their decision not to challenge the proposed merger:
does not reflect a conclusion that McDonnell Douglas is a
failing company or that Douglas Aircraft is a falling
division ... the failing company defense comes into play
only where the Commission first finds that the transaction
is likely to be anticompetitive ... [but] Douglas Aircraft is
no longer an effective competitor."
The majority, in essence, contended in its opinion that the
General Dynamics doctrine was sufficient to permit the merger to
proceed.
Despite these statements by the majority, it remains possible
(or even likely) that failing firm (or failing division)
considerations played a role in the decision by the FTC to
approve the Boeing/MDC merger. The FTC's opinion stated
that DAC's assets were likely to remain on the market due to "a
modest backlog of aircraft orders, [and that] it is unlikely that the
aircraft division would have been liquidated quickly."16' While
this statement is framed as a concession that the failing firm (or
falling division) defense is unavailable, the language would not
necessarily imply that, under a more relaxed standard, failing firm
considerations could not play a role in permitting the merger to
proceed. A number of leading commentators, including
Chairman Pitofsky himself, have suggested that antitrust
enforcement could benefit from a significant extension of the
failing firm defense to cases such as this one. For example,
Pitofsky proposed in his 1992 article that the definition of a
failing firm be widened to a firm that is likely to fail rather than a
firm in an actual condition of failure.162
159 See id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 233.
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In addition to the issue of the imminence of the firm's failure,
Pitofsky's writings may be interpreted as stating that, in theory,
he might even be willing to justify a slightly anti-competitive
merger with a broader failing firm defense. In justifying his 1992
proposal, he explicitly invokes the "private interests" rationale:
Once it becomes clear that a company is inexorably going
downhill, shareholders, creditors and workers will all
profit if it can be sold before it is a financial
basketcase .... The transfer of companies into stronger
hands is called for all the more when those companies
compete in foreign markets or face vigorous foreign
competition in domestic markets.163
Pitofsky asserts that "the primary (though perhaps not exclusive)
concern of antitrust must be to protect competition - not private
interests. Thus, the sale of assets to a company outside the market
is sure to be preferred to a sale to a large rival."1"' This statement,
however, is not inconsistent with (and may even support) a
conclusion that, should there be no outside party willing to buy a
falling division, private interest considerations may justify a
decision to permit a slightly anti-competitive merger of a firm or
division that would likely fail absent the merger.
In sum, there appears to be some evidence supporting the
conclusion that, under U.S. law and the General Dynamics
doctrine, MDC's should be seen as having overstated the
importance of its market share to competition, and Boeing's
acquisition of MDC should not be considered anti-competitive.
This conclusion may be reached in the context of U.S. law,
which is relatively more concerned with the dangers of cartel
facilitation than monopoly creation, and in light of the fact that
the amount of competitors in the market would be reduced from
three to two either way. However, due to the difficulties in law
and in fact of concluding absolutely that the merger had zero anti-
competitive effects, it is possible, and even likely, that broader
"failing firm" (and possibly private interest) considerations played
163 Id. at 234.
'" Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
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some role in leading the FTC to approve a merger that may have
had slight anti-competitive effects.
In computing the corresponding market shares of Boeing and
MDC, the EU numbers were slightly higher than U.S. estimates.
For instance, the European Union found that "backlog [order]
data is widely seen as the best indicator of market position" in the
market for commercial aircraft. 6 The European Union cited
market shares of 64%, 30%, and 6% for Boeing, Airbus, and MDC
respectively, using backlog data as of December 31, 1996.166 The
European Union then cited the average market shares of each
company, based on backlog data, for the past ten years: 61%, 27%,
and 12% for the three companies respectively.16 The EU opinion
goes on to discuss particular market shares in the wide-body and
narrow-body segments of the market, and within the European
Union itself, concluding that the patterns are "similar" and "more
or less the same." 6 ' Although the European Union does note that
it has been provided information regarding market shares based
on new firm orders169 (the figures used by the FTC1 7°), the
opinion does not cite these figures.
The European Union's comparatively larger focus on older
and more certain market share data is consistent with its position
in de Havilland and prior resistance to going as far as the U.S.
authorities have taken the General Dynamics doctrine. The result,
however, was market share figures assigning Boeing a total post-
merger share of 70-73% (vs. about 65% for the FTC), in a merger-
regulation regime already more sensitive to concerns of single
firm dominance than the U.S. authorities were.17' The European
Commission reasoned from this data that there had recently been
a gradual increase in the market share of Boeing, with a gradual
decline of the market share of MDC, leaving Airbus's share
165 EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 28, at 20.
166 See id. 29, at 20.
167 See id. 131, at 21.
168 See id. 133, at 21.
169 See id. 128, at 20.
170 It is not completely clear from the opinion that the FTC used these
figures. The author draws this inference from the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Azcuenega in her discussion of the relevant market share of
MDC. See Statement of Commissioner Azcuenega, supra note 150.
171 See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 11 29-30, at 20.
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remaining relatively constant. 72 The European Union viewed
this evidence as strongly suggesting dominance, irrespective of
whether this strength was obtained through better prices or
product quality. Among the European Commission's conclusions
from the relevant data, the following paragraph is illuminating on
the Commission's focus:
The very high market shares of Boeing already indicate a
strong position in the overall market for large commercial
aircraft .... Furthermore, after making an inroad into
Boeing's position in the 1980s, Airbus was not able
significantly to improve its position during the 1990s
whilst Boeing, already starting from a high level, was able
to increase its market share more or less continuously
during this period. This indicates that it was difficult for
Airbus to attack Boeing's position in the market even after
having gained a market share of nearly 30% in the 1980s.
This is also reflected by the fact that Airbus has not
succeeded in making a significant inroad in most of the top
10 operators' fleets . . . . The market power of Boeing,
allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently
of its competitors, is an illustration of dominance, as defined
by the [ECJ] ....
The EU opinion goes on to note other advantages that
Boeing possesses in the commercial aircraft market. Boeing has
the broadest customer base," 60% of the current worldwide fleet
in service (versus 24% for MDC, 14% for Airbus, and 2% for
Lockheed),' a broader product range, 7 6 and cost savings arising
from aircraft commonality benefits.1 ' The opinion also notes the
exclusive deals that had been signed by Boeing with three major
117 See id. 36, at 21.
7 Id. 37, at 21(emphasis added).
174 See id. 40, at 22.
"-I See id. 41, at 22.
176 See id. 41, at 22-23. Boeing is the only producer of a 400+ passenger
plane because Airbus currently produces no competitor to the Boeing 747-400.
See id. 38, at 21-22 (table).
177 See id., 43, at 23.
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airlines just prior to the merger.178 The European Commission
concluded that Boeing's position in the market for commercial
aircraft was definitely dominant." 9
The European Commission next analyzed how the acquisition
of MDC would contribute to this dominant position. The
Commission noted that the immediate effects would be that: (1)
Boeing would increase its market share from 64% to 70%; (2)
Boeing would reduce its future competitors from two to one; (3)
Boeing would increase its customer base from 60% to 84% of the
current fleet in service; (4) Boeing's production capacity would be
increased, especially in terms of its skilled work force, and (5)
Boeing's ability to induce airlines to enter into exclusive dealing
arrangements would be increased, permitting it to foreclose much
of the market to competition." In comparison, it could be noted
that only the second consideration pointed out by the European
Union was considered by U.S. regulators in their analysis, and it
was deemed irrelevant by the fact that, because DAC's future
prospects were so dim, the two competitors would likely be
reduced to one without the merger anyway.181 In the European
Commission's elaboration on the second point, it conceded that
although MDC's past influence on the market was significant, its
future prospects were indeed grim.'82 However, the Commission
concluded that MDC's competitive potential- when added to
Boeing's- would have a significant impact on the market.8
In its analysis of MDC's recent competitive significance, the
Commission's information appeared to differ significantly from
that of the FTC, leading the Commission to conclude that "the
[recent] impact of MDC on the conditions of competition in the
market for large commercial aircraft was higher than reflected by
its market share in 1996.' 4 First, the Commission noted that it
had received information from thirty-one airlines which had
purchased aircraft in the past five years. Twenty airlines stated
that, in those cases where they had purchased aircraft from either
Boeing or Airbus, MDC had been in competition for all or part of
178 See id.
179 See id. 52, at 54.
180 See id. 1 54, at 24.
181 See id. 157, at 25.
182 See id. 155, at 24.
1 See id. 56, at 25.
184 Id. 58, at 25 (emphasis added).
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the orders. Furthermore, thirteen of those airlines stated that
competition from MDC had resulted in the airline receiving
better price or purchasing conditions- with nine airlines
considering this influence to be at least "significant."18 The
Commission further cited a study by Lexecon Ltd. done on behalf
of Airbus that concluded that, of fifty-two competitions for
supplying aircraft between 1994 and 1996, MDC's presence led to
a reduction of over 7% in the realized price in orders placed with
Airbus.
18 6
However, when the European Commission turned to
analyzing MDC's likely future performance, its conclusions were
similar to that of the FTC. It noted that MDC received very few
firm new orders in 1996, and lost most of its core customers in
the previous nine months, creating the perception in the
marketplace that DAC would have no further prospects in the
market. 1 7 The European Commission thus conceded that "MDC
is no longer a real force in the market for the sale of new aircraft
on a stand-alone basis.""'
Unlike the FTC, however, the Commission then turned its
focus to the effect that MDC's competitive potential would have
in the hands of Boeing. It noted that Boeing may decide to
continue many of DAC's product lines, because the negative
market perception regarding MDC's future competitive potential
would be removed.189 MDC aircraft could also be marketed along
with Boeing aircraft. 9 The Commission noted that, as opposed
to the relatively equal playing field between Airbus and Boeing
for obtaining MDC customers that would have existed had MDC
decided to phase out its production over time, Boeing would, in
the event that the Boeing/MDC merger proceeded, have
preferential access to MDC's large customer base. 9' The
Commission noted further that this preferential access would be
exacerbated by Boeing's position providing customer support and
repair for MDC's very substantial existing fleet in service.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id. 59, at 25.
188 Id. 58 (ii), at 25 (emphasis added).
189 See id. 61, at 61.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id. 62-64, at 26.
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The European Union felt that prior precedent existed for this
fear of Boeing using its influence unfairly against its customers. It
cited an example of a letter from a Boeing executive sent to a
Japanese aircraft company that had recently bought from Airbus:
I want you to know that the Boeing Company takes such
a decision... extremely seriously. This not only comes as
a shock to me and my colleagues here, but will surely have
a negative impact on the future of the long-term
relationship our two companies have enjoyed over many
years .... More significantly, it could have undesirable
implications for the Japan America aerospace industry
cooperation.193
The European Commission also found it likely that Boeing
could use its position to its advantage vis-a-vis its suppliers against
Airbus. The opinion noted that 50% of the activities of an
aircraft manufacturer are based on supplies from third parties.'94
By adding MDC's military and commercial contracts from many
of these same suppliers, Boeing's buying power would be
substantially increased. 9 In fact, many companies would now
rely on the merged firm for over 50% of their sales, and the
prospect of losing Boeing as a customer could potentially be
ruinous for them. The Commission concluded that the ability
of Boeing to use this "monopoly power" to force competitors to
give it preferential treatment over Airbus or to discourage their
working with the consortium at all, would be significantly
enhanced by the merger. 9
The Commission felt that past practices had indicated a
likelihood of Boeing using this power over suppliers. It claimed
that Boeing's existing buying power may have negatively affected
Airbus's attempts to find a risk-sharing partner for the A3XX.'9 '
193 Id. 82 (quoting a letter from Ronald Woodard, Boeing Commercial
Airline, Group President, to a Japanese Aircraft Leasing Company, Dec. 17,
1996).
194 See id. 105, at 35.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id. 106, at 35.
198 See id. 107, at 35.
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The Commission noted that in early 1997, Northrop Grumman
decided not to participate in the risk-sharing venture, and that
following its refusal, it received a $262 million subcontract to
upgrade the AWACS radar by Boeing as prime contractor.199 The
Commission concluded that, "[i]n general, it seems likely that the
increase in Boeing's buying power could significantly weaken the
competitive position of Airbus and, in turn, strengthen the
position of Boeing."00
Not surprisingly, the European Commission concluded from
this analysis that the Boeing/MDC merger would indeed
strengthen Boeing's dominant position in the worldwide
commercial aircraft market. This conclusion was clear to the EU,
even assuming that: (1) MDC had no future competitive
significance in the market on a stand-alone basis;20' (2) it was
extremely unlikely that any third party would be interested in
acquiring DAC; and (3) DAC would soon exit the market for
commercial aircraft.0 2
The Commission did not apply a failing firm or failing
division analysis or respond to any arguments made of that
nature. In fact, the Commission strongly implied that DAC's exit
would be preferable to the current merger under relevant EU law.
This appears consistent with EU law in that: (1) failing firm
arguments have very rarely succeeded; (2) the failing division
defense has never even been addressed; and (3) the only successful
use of the failing firm defense required a showing that the non-
failing firm would have acquired all of the failing firm's market
share even absent a merger.2 3 The extensive analysis by the
Commission of how Boeing could use the merger to raise its
chances of acquiring MDC's present customer base would likely
have been enough on its own to distinguish Boeing from the only
successful failing firm case, Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, had the
Commission addressed the issue.
199 See id.
200 Id. 108, at 35.
201 See id. 58(ii), at 25.
202 See id. 60, at 26. After having engaged in extensive market inquiries,
the Commission noted that no party, besides Boeing, including Airbus and all
of its partners, was interested in purchasing DAC. See id.
203 See supra notes 14244 and accompanying text (discussing the European
Commission's decision in Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand).
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2.2.4. In Sum
It can thus be seen that the different philosophies,
assumptions, and focuses of U.S. and EU law have led to
profoundly different results. A concern with cartel-facilitation
and the general lethargy and lack of responsiveness to consumer
interests embodied in oligopoly, combined with skepticism
regarding the likelihood of persistent monopoly power and single
firm dominance, led U.S. authorities to conclude that it was
indifferent concerning the two evils of MDC either leaving the
market altogether or being merged with Boeing. A decision to
approve the merger may have been further supported by the fact
that the merger offered an opportunity to promote significant
private interests by maintaining DAC as a going concern.
However, a strong concern with monopoly creation and the
consumer-indifference of a dominant firm led EU authorities to
challenge a merger that it viewed as strongly contributing to the
dominance of the market leader, and possibly permitting it to
further erode its sole rival's market share.
2.3. Efficiencies Created by the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas
Merger
There are at least three different ways to view any efficiencies
created by the Boeing/MDC merger. One could conclude that (1)
the efficiencies will strengthen Boeing's market power and
contribute to its ability to act in an anti-competitive manner
(negative view); (2) the efficiencies are irrelevant in determining
whether the market is excessively concentrated and the merger
will lead to anti-competitive results (neutral view); or (3) the large
efficiencies are a countervailing consideration justifying some
social welfare losses from anti-competitive activity (positive view).
In general, a concern with monopoly creation and leading firm
lethargy will lead to the more negative view, while a concern with
cartel facilitation and market-wide consumer indifference, with a
corresponding focus on market structure, will lead to the neutral
view. A concern with maximizing social welfare might lead to
the positive view, while a more focused concern with consumer
welfare might lead to a mix of the neutral and positive views,
depending on the likelihood that the efficiencies will be "passed
on" to consumers in the form of lower prices or better quality
goods.
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2.3.1. Relevant U.S. Law
U.S. law has moved from a relatively neutral or negative view
of merger efficiencies towards a more positive view-with the
neutral view persisting at very high levels of concentration.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effects
"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."2°  Despite the apparent ambiguity of this language
regarding the relevance of efficiency considerations, early
decisions by the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to forbid
considerations of efficiency when assessing the impact of a merger
on competitive conditions." 5 In the past twenty years, however,
subsequent judicial decisions and new explicit determinations by
the federal enforcement bodies have made it clear that
demonstrated claims of efficiencies produced by a merger can
have a very positive impact on a merger's chances of being
approved.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that "[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to
illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers that lessen
competition may also result in economies, but it struck the
balance in favor of protecting competition."2 6 Additionally, in
the earlier case of United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the
Court explicitly denied that balancing should be permitted,
stating that an anti-competitive merger cannot be saved merely
because "on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits, it may be deemed beneficial."
217
However, current U.S. courts are much more hospitable to
efficiency considerations. Despite the Supreme Court's
declaration in Procter & Gamble, Chairman Pitofsky has noted
that Congress never specifically addressed the question of possible
tradeoffs in the antitrust statutes between anti-competitive effects
and likely efficiencies.0 8 In fact, nothing in the language or
legislative history of the antitrust statutes suggests that an
efficiencies defense in the area of merger enforcement would be
204 15 U.S.C. §18 (1999).
205 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
206 Id. at 580.
207 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
208 See Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 206.
[Vol. 20:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss4/3
A VOIDING ANOTHER NEAR-MISS
inappropriate." 9 Furthermore, since the 1977 Sylvania decision,
the Supreme Court has begun to seriously entertain claims of
efficiency when assessing the competitive significance of various
practices.210 One commentator suggests that earlier decisions such
as Procter & Gamble represent "a different era in antitrust, an era
in which formalistic rules rather than economic reasoning ruled
the day and efficiencies often were thought harmful."21 Although
no merger case has reached the Supreme Court since Sylvania, a
variety of lower courts have already begun finding ways to
examine efficiency claims,"' and it has been asserted that the
current trend is toward regarding efficiency as a "plus factor" that
could make the difference in a close case.
213
U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities view positively any
possible efficiencies generated by a merger because of the
possibility of translating these efficiencies into lower costs for the
firm's customers.2"4 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
explicitly recognize the importance of merger-generated
efficiencies.2 ' In addition, these Guidelines were reviewed and
amended in 1996 to further support the idea that efficiencies will
be considered positively.216 The revised Guidelines state that
"mergers have the potential to generate significant efficiencies by
permitting a better utilization of existing assets, enabling the
combined firm to achieve lower costs in producing a given
quatitity and quality than either firm could have achieved without
the proposed transaction.""2 ' The Guidelines go on to state the
Agencies' policy that they will "not challenge a merger if
cognizable efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that
209 Seeid. at 211.
210 See Joseph Kattan, The Role of Efficiency Considerations in the Federal
rade Commission's Antitrust Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 617 (1996)
:liscussing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
211 Id.
212 See Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 211.
213 See Lao, supra note 67, at 379; see also F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938
2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant is permitted to use
erger-generated efficiencies to rebut the government's prima facie case).
24 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, S 4.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 1d.
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the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant
market." '
Proof of efficiencies will presumably be sufficient to save an
otherwise anti-competitive merger if, in an apparent balancing
test, they outweigh the likely anticompetitive dangers:
To make the requisite determination, the Agency
considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be
sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm
consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price
increases in that market . . . .The greater the potential
adverse competitive effect of a merger.., the greater must
be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to
conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive
effect in the relevant market . . . . In the Agency's
experience, efficiencies are most likely to make a difference
in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive
effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great. 219
A more concrete suggestion of when merger-generated
efficiencies should justify an otherwise anti-competitive merger
can be found in Pitofsky's 1992 article:
In any market where postmerger concentration is
moderate, and the combined company after the merger
would hold less than 35% of the market, a horizontal
merger should be legal if the defendants can clearly
support the claim that production efficiencies leading to a
substantial reduction in unit costs will result and these
efficiencies could not be achieved through a much less
restrictive alternative.'a
Pitofsky considered this proposal to be "conservative. " "
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 218.
221 See id.
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The Agencies are less likely to view efficiencies as important
in cases of extremely high market concentration. The current
Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that "[e]fficiencies almost
never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly."'
Pitofsky's 1992 proposal stated that if a firm "holds thirty-five
percent or more of the market, and the acquired firm has any
significant market position (even two or three percent), claims of
efficiency should not protect an otherwise illegal merger even in a
moderately concentrated market."' The Agencies' and
Chairman Pitofsky's views are that efficiency claims can be
extremely important in evaluating a merger, but that mergers in
highly concentrated markets will presumptively not be entitled to
an efficiencies defense absent the acquired company's having an
extremely weak market position- such as less than 2-3% (this
caveat, as the prior Section suggests, is highly relevant to the
Boeing/MDC case). 4 An observer will note that the view that
efficiencies become less relevant as market concentration goes up
appears to be very consistent with: (1) a fear that gains from
efficiency will be dominated by deadweight losses at high levels of
market share or market concentration; and/or (2) the belief that
the gains from efficiencies in imperfect markets will be confined
to producers and not passed on to consumers.
In practice, the evidence supports the view that efficiency
analysis can be an important factor in the Agencies' decisions on
whether to block a merger. One commentator claims that:
In the area of merger enforcement, the antitrust
enforcement agencies have found the right balance by
adjusting the core analysis of competitive effects to
account indirectly for the enhanced likelihood that certain
transactions are likely to bring about efficiencies .... In
industries in which scale economies are significant, the
agencies have routinely, and quite correctly, adjusted the
numerical presumptions of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.... "
m Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 4.
z Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 219 (emphasis added).
2' See supra Section 2.2.3.
2 Kattan, supra note 210, at 614.
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Empirical evidence also supports the view that, as suggested
by the Merger Guidelines 6 and recommended in Pitofsky's 1992
article, the Agencies are less likely to challenge a merger in an
industry where efficiencies are likely and market concentration is
not.
227
2.3.2. EU Law on Merger Efficiencies
The EU Merger Regulation has been interpreted to view
merger-created efficiencies at least neutrally, and possibly
negatively. This viewpoint is consistent with this article's earlier
observation that EU law is relatively more concerned with
monopoly creation, single-firm dominance, and the non-economic
consequences of large, super-efficient, firms. 8 The EU Merger
Regulation declares a merger to be incompatible with the
common market if it "creates or strengthens a [dominant] position
as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it is
significantly impeded." 9
Although the Merger Regulation permits the Commission to
consider whether the merger promotes "technical and economic
progress,""0 the evidence seems to indicate that the EU authorities
do not interpret this clause to mean that an otherwise anti-
competitive merger may be permitted because of efficiency
considerations. In fact, the evidence suggests that the
Commission disregards the value of efficiencies in evaluating
mergers. 1 Sir Leon Brittan, the Commissioner responsible for
competition policy at the time of the enactment of the Merger
Regulation, has stated that "[i]n a competitive market, mergers
may or may not give rise to technical and economic progress. In
an uncompetitive market, even if they do, they will not be
allowed. " 2" It is likely that this position is based at least partly on
226 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at § 4.
SSee Kattan, supra note 210, at 614 ("It is no accident that we seldom see
a challenge of a defense industry merger, hospital merger, or software merger
where four or more surviving competitors remain in the relevant market.").
228 See supra Section 1.2 for additional discussion.
229 EU Merger Regulation, supra note 6, at (L 257/15).
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., Opi, supra note 31, at 282.
232 Griffin & Sharp, supra note 31, at 668 (citing Sir Leon Brittan, The Law
and Policy ofMerger Control in the EEC, 15 EuK. L. REv. 351, 353 (1990)).
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the assumption that any economic benefit of the transaction
would be "confined to the dominant company in the form of
monopoly rents." 3  Another commentator concludes that,
although there are some cases where the Commission has
suggested that efficiencies can be viewed procompetitively, for the
moment, it appears that the Commission's view is that a
concentration which creates or strengthens a clearly dominant
position for a single firm cannot be "saved" by a showing of
economic efficiencies, regardless of how strong the showing maybe. 234
The discussion of efficiencies in the recent case Aerospatiale-
Alenia/de Havilland (de Havillan)"5 further suggests that parties
will not be permitted to justify an otherwise impermissible
merger. ATR was the leading manufacturer of commuter aircraft,
but acquisition of the Canadian company de Havilland would
have given ATR a fuller line of aircraft and cost savings
amounting to approximately 1/2% of annual turnover." The
Commission concluded that, not only were these cost savings
insufficient to promote technical or economic progress, but even
if they were, such progress would not lead to any benefits for
consumers." In short, because of the Commission's focus on the
dangers of monopoly creation and the importance of consumer
welfare, the permissibility- and the wisdom- of considering
efficiency claims in evaluating a merger was strongly rejected.
The evidence supports the view that not only has there been
no "efficiency defense" under EU merger review law, but there
may be an "efficiency attack.""8 EU law, principally concerned
with dominant firms- for economic and non-economic
reasons- tends to focus on whether particular "advantages" will
result for the merged firm- including, possibly, economic
" Id. (citing Sir Leon Brittan, The Law and Policy ofMerger Control in the
EEC, 15 EUR. L. REv. 351, 353 (1990)). This issue is often referred to as
whether efficiency gains are "passed on" to consumers.
2 See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 27, at 269.
2 See supra Section 2.2.2 (discussing the European Commission's decision
in de Havilland).
236 See Griffin & Sharp, supra note 31, at 669.
237 See id.
238 See id. at 671 (citing Frederic Jenny, EEC Merger Control: Economies as
an Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust Attack?, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
591, 597).
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-efficiencies. 9  Frederic Jenny, as a member of the French
Competition Council, concluded that an examination of the
relevant EU case law suggests that the Commission often
considers mergers that contribute to economic efficiency to be
more likely to create a dominant position:
The possibility that a merger might lead to static... [or]
dynamic efficiency gains.., which other nonmerging
firms are unlikely to achieve is interpreted as prima facie
evidence that the merger will enable the merging firms to
acquire a dominant position incompatible with the
common market.24
It should be noted that Jenny concluded that, although this
approach is warranted by the applicable EU legislation, this
position is unwise from a public policy standpoint.24
2.3.3. The Differing Laws Applied to the Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas Merger
Extraordinary efficiencies were expected to be generated by
the Boeing/MDC merger. By most accounts, the primary
purpose of Boeing's acquisition of MDC was to generate
efficiencies from MDC's space and defense businesses.242 In
addition to this expectation, the combined company was expected
to achieve a better balance between commercial and military
work, making it less vulnerable to demand fluctuations in each
volatile industry.243 As this section will demonstrate, however,
2 See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 27, at 268.
240 Griffin & Sharp, supra note 31, at 671 (citing Frederic Jenny, EEC
Merger Control: Economies as an Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust Attack?, 1992
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 591, 603).
241 See id.
242 See J. R. Wilson, Anatomy of a Merger, 52 INTERAOVIA BUS. & TECH.,
June 1, 1997, at 44. For instance, it has been reported that the consolidation of
activities from Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, and Rockwell relating to the
International Space Station will generate savings of $20 million to $25 million
per year. See Mergers Let Boeing Save $25 Million a Year on Station, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Sept. 30, 1997, at 486.
243 Before the merger, Boeing's activities were approximately 70%
commercial and 30% military, while MDCs actions consisted of
approximately 70% military and 30% commercial. Boeing predicted a post-
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substantial efficiencies were anticipated in the commercial aircraft
business as well. A few examples of the efficiencies expected on
the commercial aircraft side will illustrate how the differing U.S.
and EU laws were (or, in the case of the United States, may have
been) applied by the relevant merger-review agencies. Consistent
with the applicable law, the European Commission viewed most
of them negatively while U.S. authorities likely viewed the
efficiencies that were created either neutrally or slightly
positively.
One benefit of the MDC acquisition for Boeing was an
increase in capacity and flexibility. The merging of the
production facilities, repair services, and support staff was
expected to give Boeing much needed capacity at a time when the
company was anticipating one of the largest increases in volume
ever." The European Commission explicitly noted that Boeing's
dominant market position would be strengthened by the addition
of capacity from MDC, explaining that "a manufacturer that can
offer the required delivery slots in periods of rapidly increasing
demand clearly has an advantage."'24  In addition to the added
ability to meet future demand and possible returns to scale, the
chief advantage of extra capacity is added flexibility. The
acquisition of MDC's skilled engineers also had the potential to
add to Boeing's flexibility. For example, as noted by the
Commission, MDC's engineers who work on military transport
aircraft (the C17) are particularly easy to switch to commercial
aircraft production in times of increased demand.246
Similarly, the acquisition of MDC's complementary product
line was expected to generate efficiencies. The European
Commission cited the fact that Boeing had the advantage of
cost savings arising from commonality benefits, such as
engineering spares inventory and flight crew
qualifications... [which] are very influential in an airline's
merger revenue split of 60/40% in favor of income from sale of commercial
aircraft. See Wilson, supra note 242, at 44.
24 See, e.g., Boeing Posts Profit for Second Period, Reversing 95 Loss, WALL
ST. J., July 26, 1996, at A3 (stating that Boeing was expecting a "major
production surge" and quoting sources familiar with the Company as stating
that Boeing was expecting "record production" by 1999).
245 EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 67, at 27.
246 See id.
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decision-making process for aircraft type selections and
may frequently lead to the acquisition of a certain type of
aircraft even if the price of competing products is lower.2 4
Substantial gains on the commercial side were expected from
the synergy between the commercial and defense units, in
particular the availability of research and development ("R&D")
from the defense side to aid production on the commercial
aircraft side.248 The Commission was particularly concerned
about this prospect, detailing at long length the immense amount
of R&D funds that would go to the combined company.249 In
addition to the possibility of Boeing earning the use of this
publicly funded technology at no cost to its commercial side, the
Commission was concerned with the ability of Boeing's
commercial side to use these R&D opportunities to increase
general company know-how, and to take advantage of specialized
equipment or tools purchased for the defense side."' The
European Commission's opinion details different ways in which
these advantages would enable Boeing to reduce its costs in
designing and manufacturing commercial aircraft."'
A number of other efficiencies expected by the merger were
reported in the media, such as returns to scale and reduction of
duplicative services.2"2  It has been reported that the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger, merely by reducing
duplicate services company-wide, could result in significant
savings.' Even though McDonnell-Douglas made many fewer
247 Id. 41, at 22
248 The EU Commission decision notes that Boeing disagreed with many
of its factual conclusions regarding the extent to which its commercial side
would benefit from MDC technology. See id. 97, at 33. Unless otherwise
stated, this article assumes, for the sake of argument, that the European
Union's conclusions are factually correct.
249 See id. 84-93, at 30-32.
250 See id. 92, at 32.
251 See id.
252 See Lane, supra note 79 (reporting commentators as saying that the
merger would create synergies an' reduce overhead costs); see Mergers Let
Boeing Save $25 Million a Year on Station, supra note 242 (discussing the savings
generated by the post-merger consolidation of space station activities
previously managed by Boeing and McDonnell Douglas); Wilson, supra note
242 (noting synergies in military helicopters and space and other benefits of the
merger).
253 See id.
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planes than Boeing, its procedures are considered to be very
efficient, resulting in better margins than Boeing realizes on most
of its aircraft. In addition to the substantial returns to scale on
R&D, many of the two companies' more than 400 laboratories,
wind-tunnels, and test facilities offer duplicate services and can
therefore be eliminated." 4
The European Commission viewed Boeing's prospective
improvements in flexibility, cost-structure, and financial resources
with trepidation. Rather than focusing on the general welfare-
enhancing effects, or assuming that these benefits would translate
into gains for consumers, the Commission feared that the merger
efficiencies would lead to an increase in Boeing's ability to exert
market power and act independently of its consumers. As one
example, the Commission suggested that post-merger it was
possible, even likely, that Boeing could engage in a scheme of
predatory pricing. The opinion claimed that the acquisition
would insure Boeing a monopoly in both the 400+ jumbo jet
market as well as the market for smaller aircraft. The European
Commission believed that this situation would permit Boeing to
charge supracompetitive prices in those markets in order to price
at or below cost in the mid-size market, squeezing out Airbus
entirely. 55 Although the Commission noted that a monopoly in
the jumbo jet and smaller aircraft segments would likely have
existed absent the merger, the vast increase in R&D funds and
cost-savings made this possibility all the more likely,256 especially
given Airbus's weaker financial position because of its status as a
mere consortium.257
The Commission believed that it had possible evidence of this
abusive predatory pricing tactic already- against DAC. It cited
an example, reported by the Washington Post, that:
SAS's [Scandinavian Airline Systems] internal evaluating
committee had recommended the purchase of 50 of
Douglas' proposed new 100-seat MD-95 jetliners for US $
254 See Paul Proctor, Lab Downsizing Expected, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., June 16, 1997.
" See ELI Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 78-79, at 29.
256 See id. 78-81, at 29.
257 See id. 76, at 29; see also infra notes 371-74 and accompanying text
(discussing subsequent developments).
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20 million each. Instead, [SAS Chairman] said that SAS
would order 35 of a new version of Boeing's venerable 737
at about U.S. $19 million per plane, a steep discount from
Boeing's list price. "It was clear that Boeing's strategy was
to prevent Douglas from ever launching the MD-95,"
recalled one salesman involved in the competition.258
The Commission went on to note that the lowest published
1996 price for the relevant 737 was U.S. $ 32 million. Financial
analysts calculate a likely 30% profit margin on the plane which
would lead to a cost of U.S. $ 22 million.29 The analysis done by
the Commission appears consistent with the earlier conclusion
that EU law was much more hospitable to claims of predatory
pricing.
21°
The preceding discussion illustrates how the European
Commission developed a negative view of the Boeing/MDC
merger's potential for creating efficiencies in the commercial
aircraft market because of its concern with the single firm
dominance. The FTC's explanatory statement, on the other
hand, did not mention any efficiency issues at all. One of two
conclusions appears likely from this omission, given the current
U.S. position on efficiencies: (1) that the FTC viewed the merger
not to be anti-competitive and therefore had no reason to discuss
efficiencies, or (2) that the FTC may have viewed the merger as
slightly anti-competitive, but found the large efficiencies to
outweigh this small risk, and omitted this discussion in the final
opinion.
In support of the view that the FTC did not consider
efficiency at all is the fact that U.S. law and Pitofsky's writings
seem to suggest that efficiencies will not be used to justify an anti-
competitive merger in such a highly-concentrated industry.261
The FTC, consistent with the focus on cartel-facilitation in U.S.
law, may have concluded that the number of competitors in the
market was the main (or only) issue, and blocking the merger
would not prevent DAC's exit from the market.
25 EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 79, at 29.
259 See id. 80, at 30.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 4649.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 222-27.
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However, the author believes that the second theory- that
the FTC did take efficiency into account at some level, is more
likely. This conclusion is reinforced by: (i) the author's
determination, in Section 2.2., that the acquisition of MDC must
be seen as raising some anti-competitive concerns, and (ii) the fact
that it is highly unlikely that any policymaker could ignore the
significant efficiencies that were expected to be generated by the
merger- both in the production of commercial aircraft and on
Boeing's defense side (see next section). It will be noted, however,
that either theory if adopted by the FTC, would be entirely
consistent with prior U.S. law and precedent- just as the EU's
opposing conclusions were entirely consistent with EU precedent.
2.3.4. A Further Complicationfor U.S. Authorities:
Efficiencies and the Defense Industry
A further complication in analyzing efficiencies in the
Boeing/MDC merger is that the chief anti-competitive concerns
centered around the commercial aircraft market, while a major
purpose of the merger was to generate efficiencies relating to the
space and defense markets. A number of issues are brought into
play by this fact, among them: (1) should efficiencies generated in
one market be permitted to offset anti-competitive effects in
another, and (2) should antitrust authorities give more weight to
efficiencies in the defense industry? Of particular interest here is
how established U.S. law would answer these questions, and
whether the FTC considered these issues when analyzing the
Boeing/MDC merger and acted consistently with prior precedent.
The FTC and DOJ revised the efficiencies section of the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1997, adding relevant language
on the issue of multi-market anti-competitive and efficiency
effects. The Guidelines state that the agencies "will not challenge
a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive
in any relevant market."262 A footnote following this statement
notes that § 7 of the Clayton Act "prohibits mergers that may
substantially lessen competition 'in any line of commerce... in
any section of the country."'263 This suggests, and the Guidelines
262 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, S 4.
263 Id. S 4, n.36.
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confirm, that the agencies will normally judge anti-competitive
effects in each relevant market independently.M
However, footnote thirty-six of the Guidelines goes on to
state that:
In some cases, however, the Agency in its prosecutorial
discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the
relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a
partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly
eliminate the anti-competitive effect in the relevant market
without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s).
Inextricably linked efficiencies rarely are a significant
factor in the Agency's determination not to challenge a
merger. They are most likely to make a difference when
they are great and the likely anti-competitive effect in the
relevant market(s) is small.265
It thus appears that the FTC believes that it may consider
significant efficiencies in a related market when the two industries
are "inextricably linked." Commentators have made that
characterization about the commercial aircraft, space, and defense
industries,266 and indeed it appeared unlikely that there would be a
buyer willing to purchase a divested DAC. The presence of such
a buyer would have largely eliminated the antitrust concerns and
permitted the defense and space divisions to merge.267  The
statement that the agencies are most likely to consider these
effects when the efficiencies are great and the likely anti-
competitive effects are small indicates that the context of the
264 See id.
265 Id.
266 See, e.g., Peace in Our Time: Boeing v. Airbus, supra note 54, at 59
(characterizing the commercial aircraft and defense industries as "joined at the
hip").
267 In addition to the likelihood that it would be practically difficult to
separate DAC from MDC, it seems unlikely that another purchaser would be
interested in DACs commercial aircraft business as a stand-alone company.
MDC itself appeared unable to keep the business operating profitably in the
long run, and any independent company would probably do even worse.
Air us was probably not available as a purchaser because of its status as a
consortium- i.e., not a true single entity or company.
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Boeing/MDC merger may be precisely what the agencies had in
mind when composing this footnote.
The agencies' decision to consider efficiencies created in
interrelated markets, when divestiture of the related businesses is
not possible, should not be surprising. The willingness to
consider efficiency gains to balance off anti-competitive risk is a
pure wealth/utility tradeoff. Requiring that both of these effects
be in the same market seems excessively formalistic- unless one
wishes to insure that the welfare gains go to the same group of
consumers that receive the welfare losses. If, however, the
agencies do view the requirement that the industries be
"inextricably linked" as in furtherance of this goal, then the
Boeing/MDC merger should not benefit from that
characterization, since the consumer of defense-related products
(the government) is not the same as the consumers of commercial
aircraft.
There are a number of reasons why it has been argued that
merger efficiencies in the defense industry should be viewed as
particularly important. At the outset, it might be argued that
U.S. national security depends highly on the defense sector, and
that these concerns should be addressed by treating the sector
differently. Although some may argue that the Department of
Defense should police antitrust concerns in the defense industry
given these unique concerns, "[f]or now, there appears to be a
bureaucratic consensus on the application of antitrust regulations
to mergers in the defense industry."268 Still, there remains the
underlying fact that efficiencies relating to defense projects may
be considered particularly important by a government body given
that national interests, and not merely consumer satisfaction, are
at stake. The U.S. Department of Defense sent a letter to the
European Commission noting that failure to approve the
Boeing/MDC merger "could harm important U.S. defen[s]e
interests."269 Since even the EU opinion claimed to give some
weight to U.S. "national interests... particularly those stemming
from the consolidation of the U.S. defen[s]e industry,"' ° it seems
unlikely that U.S. authorities gave no consideration to this issue.
268 Shwartz, supra note 70, at 376.
269 EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 12, at 17.
o Id. 11, at 17.
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In addition, the U.S. government (and taxpayers) stand to
gain directly from any efficiencies generated by the merger as
contract prices of most defense systems are based on costs." This
could be seen as guaranteeing that the benefits of the merger
would not be confined solely to the merging parties, but would be
"passed on." Especially when viewed in terms of the U.S.
government bearing the cost of the excess defense capacity and
overhead in the industry, this would appear to strongly support
recognition that efficiencies will lead directly to welfare
improvement.
It might be further argued that efficiencies in the defense
sector should be weighed more heavily because the industry is in
decline and is in need of restructuring. Although this rationale
has not been used recently, there is U.S. Supreme Court
precedent for this view in the case of Appalachian Coals Inc. v.
United StatesY 2 Many well-known economists have concluded
that arguments for permitting mergers in order to achieve
efficiencies are particularly strong in the distressed industries
setting. 3 For instance, Pitofsky's 1992 article advocated that "[i]n
markets showing moderate concentration.., mergers... among
firms in distressed industries should be permitted....
[D]istressed industries are defined as industries with a long-term
decline in sales... low profits.., and substantial underutilization
of capacity." 4 There is little doubt that the defense industry
meets Pitofsky's definition of a distressed industry: defense
procurement declined by more than 68% from 1986 to 1996,"z
and capacity in some firms was as low as 20-30% in 19 9 7 .Z6
27 See Lao, supra note 67, at 363.
272 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (finding certain cooperative practices not to be a
violation of the antitrust laws because inter alia, they occurred in an industry
in decline).
23 See Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 238, citing MICHAEL E.
PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 663 (1990) ("The only
consistent case for suspending competition in selected instances is to encourage
the flow of resources out of structurally declining industries."); F.M. SCHERER
& DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 164 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that "in declining industries, mergers
enable least efficient units of production to be shut down").
274 Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 238.
275 See Shwartz, supra note 70, at 329.
276 See Lao, supra note 67, at 362-63.
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In addition to the extra need for efficiency in a distressed
industry, there is more reason to believe that efficiency claims in
distressed industries- normally difficult to prove- are legitimate.
One scholar notes that "defense firms have enormous fixed costs
and... vast overcapacity .... [A] claim that a merger would
enable the achievement of significant scale economies by
eliminating duplicative or unproductive plants and facilities is
most likely legitimate."' 7
Unlike the general efficiencies defense, however, the current
Merger Guidelines say nothing about mergers in distressed
industries, so it is unclear as to how much the FTC would weigh
considerations of this nature, if at all." However, it can be
concluded that if the FTC was willing to consider the efficiencies
generated in the defense and space sectors, it is likely that it would
not have had a difficult time finding immense and important
efficiencies.
The FTC and Chairman Pitofsky have already expressed an
interest in merger-produced efficiency gains. In addition, much
current scholarship, including Chairman Pitofsky's writings,
suggest that an increased sensitivity to these concerns in the
context of distressed industries, such as defense, is wise. Despite
the expressed limitation of the efficiency defense (and distressed
industry concerns) to cases of only moderate concentration, the
author finds it difficult to believe that the FTC gave no positive
value to the huge efficiencies to be created by the merger" - even
if only on the defense side. This likelihood is strengthened by the
fact that the consumers of defense-related products, and the U.S.
government in particular, stood to gain directly from any merger-
generated efficiencies. Had the FTC any reservations at all about
the Boeing/MDC merger, this may be a case where incredibly
277 Id. at 380.
278 It has also been argued that the monopsony of the defense industry
(with the U.S. government as the sole buyer) is another reason not to challenge
mergers in the defense industry. See Lao, supra note 67, at 351. However, it is
enough to note that this argument is not relevant to the Boeing/MDC merger
dispute, where the anti-competitive problems were in the commercial aircraft
sector, not the defense sector.
z" The remarks of Chairman Pitofsky lend more credence to this view.
See Pitofsky, Staples Speech, supra note 42, at 6 ("Several of the 'anti-
competitive effects' identified by the E.G. [in the de Havilland case, involving
large market shares] would not be given much weight in an American court;
indeed they might be regarded today as efficiency rather than anti-competitiveeffect.").
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high efficiency considerations overwhelmed a small but not
insignificant risk of anti-competitive effects. In short, although
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines maintain that "[e]fficiencies
almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near monopoly,"
280
this may be a case where almost was the key word.
2.3.5. In Sum
As shown above, the two bodies' contrasting positions with
respect to efficiencies expected from the Boeing/MDC merger
were entirely consistent with- and almost to be expected from-
previously existing differences in antitrust law. The European
Commission correctly noted that Boeing's ability to exercise its
market power in the commercial aircraft market would be
strengthened by its acquisition of MDC, as well as the related
merger efficiencies, and that no new entry could be expected to
erode this position in the near future. The Commission further
doubted that any efficiencies generated would be passed on to
consumers through long-lasting price cuts. The FTC likely
concluded that the vast efficiencies created by the merger do not
make the merger anti-competitive under U.S. antitrust law, would
not facilitate oligopolist pricing, and could even serve to offset
any hypothetical, small, anti-competitive effects by means of
lower prices and higher quality goods. The FTC may also have
recognized efficiency gains in the interrelated defense sector,
where efficiency gains are more probable, more crucial to
industry survival, and more likely to be passed on to the primary
purchaser because of cost-based pricing.
2.4. The Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
2.4.1. U.S. Law
U.S. law traditionally analyzes exclusive supply arrangements
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, using a rule of reason
approach.2"' As a vertical non-price restraint (i.e., not an
agreement between competitors), exclusive dealing arrangements
280 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 4.
281 See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st
Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 20:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss4/3
A VOIDING ANOTHER NEAR-MISS
are not viewed as inherently suspect under U.S. law.282 U.S. law
has identified a variety of procompetitive effects of exclusive
dealing arrangements, including the fact that a buyer can engage
in longer-term planning when assured of adequate supplies and
predictable costs."' One recent U.S. appellate court decision
noted that the possibility of exclusive deals may even encourage
competition between firms in order to obtain the exclusive
contract."4 The court admitted, however, that this process may
raise barriers against prospective entrants.28
Current U.S. antitrust law that identifies anticompetitive
effects of exclusive dealing arrangements focuses on the extent to
which the market is foreclosed to rivals by the exclusive contract.
A high percentage of foreclosure suggests that competition by
current competitors and new entrants will be substantially
lessened by their lack of access to the foreclosed market.
Market foreclosure of 40% has been found to violate the antitrust
laws,28 and recent decisions and statements by the agencies have
suggested that foreclosure of 20-30% may be the lower limit for
illegality.288 Longer lasting exclusive dealing arrangements will be
examined with higher scrutiny, since they pose a more significant
burden to competition.289 In addition, the existence of high
barriers to entry in the market may contribute to a finding of
excessive foreclosure. 20  There is some evidence that U.S.
authorities are becoming more concerned with exclusive dealings,
282 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977)
(holding that vertical non-price restraints are subject to the rule of reason).
283 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1949).
284 See Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42
(7th Cir. 1996).
285 See id. at 46-47.
286 See, e.g., Parikh v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 395, 401 D. Mass.
1996).
287 See FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 393 (1953).
288 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984)
(finding 30% to be insufficient for illegality without any direct evidence of
foreclosure); Dept of Just. and FTC Statements of Enforcement Pol'y and
Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) §§ 13, 152, at 20, 787-88 (Sept. 30, 1994).
289 See Motion Picture Adver., 344 U.S. at 394 (agreeing with the FTC that
the exclusive contract in question should be limited to one year).
293 See, e.g., Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 11 (1st
Cir. 1987).
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if the high profile 1990s cases involving Microsoft and Toys "R"
Us are any guide.291
It should be understood that the preceding analysis is
independent of merger-review law- it is done when analyzing
whether the company has violated § 1 of the Sherman Act with
the exclusive contract. Under U.S. law, the existence of a merger
presumably will not have any effect on the legality of vertical
agreements with third party suppliers, unless it would somehow
increase the quantity or quality of the market foreclosed to
competitors. Similarly, the prior existence of legal exclusive
agreements is presumably not likely to be relevant in a merger
analysis under § 7 of the Clayton Act, except to the extent that it
may impact the likelihood of new entry292 or the General
Dynamics-type analysis of whether a given market share
adequately represents a firm's future power in the market.293
2.4.2. EU Law
Exclusive dealing contracts are viewed more suspiciously
under EU law than under U.S. law. The legality of these
arrangements is often raised, as in U.S. law, in the context of the
general prohibition against agreements between firms that may
restrict competition: in the European Union, anticompetitive
effects of exclusive dealing contracts are analyzed under Article
85.294 In addition, Article 86's prohibition against the "abuse of a
dominant position" can also apply to the use of exclusive supply
arrangements- even when the buyer suggests the terms.29  The
291 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(challenging Microsoft's licensing of its operating system on a per-processor
basis); In re Toys "R" Us Corp., No. 9273, 1997 F.T.C. Lexis 284 (F.T.C. Sept.
25, 1997) (initial decision of the AU) (finding vertical agreements restrictingdistribution to be contrary to § 5 of the FTC Act); PHILIP AREEDA & LOUISKAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 476 n.19 (5th ed. 1997) (suggesting that
Microsoft's per processor licenses could be considered exclusive dealing
arrangements. At the time of publication, the DOJ had yet another high-profile action pending against Microsoft in federal district court with respect to
Microsoft's Windows software.
292 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, 3.3.
293 See id. § 1.521.
294 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47648.
295 See Richard P. Lewis, Canadian Monopolies Law: Director Of
Investigation and Research v. Nutrasweet Co., Decided As First Case Under Abuse-OfeDominance Provision, 25 CORNELL INT'L .. 437, 469 (1992) (citing Case
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ECJ stated in Hoffman-LaRoche that exclusive supply contracts
are:
[I]ncompatible with the objective of undistorted
competition within the Common Market [because]...
they are not based on an economic transaction which
justifies this burden or benefit but are designed to deprive
the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources
of supply and to deny other producers access to the
market.296
This statement does, however, appear to rest on the
assumption that the dominant firm is receiving most of the
benefits of the transaction, which leaves open the possibility that
the ECJ would be more sympathetic to transactions with greater
"economic equivalency. "' 97
It was found in Hoffman-LaRoche to be a violation of Article
86 to give: (1) a "fidelity rebate," which is a discount conditioned
on the purchaser obtaining most or all of its product requirements
from the dominant firm (and is not necessarily the same thing as a
"quantity rebate" based on the seller's economies of scale), and (2)
a total purchase rebate, which creates similar incentives by
calculating the rebate on the basis of total purchases of all
products from the dominant firm. 298 In 1983, the ECJ used the
same analysis in finding an abuse by Michelin giving distributors
rebates for purchasing only Michelin tires, with a variable
discount which appeared to act like a fidelity rebate.299 One
commentator summarizes the EU law by stating that:
The Hoffman-LaRoche and Michelin cases thus designate as
abuse any conduct which places significant pressure on an
enterprise to deal with a dominant enterprise unless (1)
85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 539, 3
C.M.L.R. 211, 289 (1979)).
296 Hoffman-LaRoche, 3 C.M.L.R. at 290.
297 See David J. Gerber, Law and the Abuse of Economic Power in Europe, 62
TuL. L. REV. 57, 97 (1987).
298 See id. at 95; see also Lewis, supra note 295, at 470.
299 See Case 332/81, N.V. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v.
Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 507, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,031 (1983).
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there is economic equivalency in the transactions, (2) the
conduct has no significant effect on the structure of
competition, or (3) the conduct is normal for non-
dominant firms."0
In addition, the exclusive dealing arrangement is much more
relevant under EU merger law because, unlike U.S. law, the focus
of EU law is on what the merger's effect will be with respect to
the creation or strengthening of a dominant firm. Since EU law
under Article 86 appears to find exclusive dealings relevant in the
analysis of firm dominance and the abuse of a dominant position,
the ability of a merger to increase the likelihood or dangerousness
of exclusive deals will directly impact the analysis of the merger's
effect on the market and dominant firm.
2.4.3. Application of U.S. and EU Law to the Boeing Exclusive
Dealing Arrangements
In November 1996, Boeing and American Airlines entered
into a long-term partnership that made Boeing American's
exclusive aircraft supplier until the year 2018. American placed
firm orders for more than 100 aircraft, plus purchase rights to
more than 500 more.30 1 A similar deal followed in March 1997
between Boeing and Delta Airlines. This deal again made Boeing
Delta's exclusive supplier for twenty years, and Delta made more
than 100 firm orders and more than 500 more purchase options of
various types.30 2 In June 1997, a third deal was signed with
Continental Airlines, giving Boeing another twenty year exclusive
supply agreement, with more than thirty firm orders.3 3 Differing
estimates, presumably depending on demand forecasts and valuing
the purchase options, determined that these deals represented
about 11-13% of the global market for relevant commercial
aircraft.3"
The FTC admitted that the exclusive supply deals that Boeing
entered into with the three major airlines were "potentially
30 Gerber, supra note 297, at 97.
301 See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 43, at 23.
302 See id. 44, at 23.
303 See id.
304 See id. 46, at 23 (estimating 13%); FTC Majority's July 1 Statement,
supra note 80 (estimating 11%).
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troubling.""5 In particular, the FTC noted the barriers to
competition that the agreements created, exacerbated by the fact
that American, Delta, and Continental were only three of the
mere handful of airlines with the prestige and scale to serve as
"launch" customers for potentially new aircraft manufacturers."6
The ability of any potential new entrant to reach a minimum
efficient scale and achieve profitability- which would require a
substantial initial order of new aircraft- is significantly decreased
without access to major airlines capable of meeting much of the
demand alone. The FTC, in approving the merger, concluded
only that it "intend[s] to monitor the potential anti-competitive
effects of these, and any future, long term exclusive contracts."0"
Subsequent statements have revealed that two major factors
played into the FTC's decision not to block or impose conditions
on the Boeing/MDC merger relating to the exclusive dealing
arrangements. First, the FTC recognized that the 11% market
foreclosure was significantly below the 20-30% that appeared to
be a relatively "safe harbor" under current U.S. Supreme Court
precedent and agency practice.30 8 Second, as mentioned earlier,
there is no clear connection between prior exclusive dealing
arrangements and the principal focus of U.S. merger law- the
effect that a merger will have on competition and future prices.
The General Counsel for the FTC recently stated that "the U.S.
in Boeing's case tended to regard the exclusives as business
arrangements that antedated the merger and were not relevant to
how the merger might change competition and prices."0 9
One might question whether the FTC should have taken the
exclusive dealing arrangements into account, in the manner
permitted by General Dynamics,310 either by lowering its estimates
of the likelihood of market entry, or as evidence that Boeing's
... See FTC Majority's July 1 Statement, supra note 80.
3C6 See id.
307 Id.
318 See Robert Pitofsky, Prepared Remarks for the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute, 24th Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 16-
17, 1997) transcript available at < http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
pitofsky/fordham7.htm > (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
446 U.S. 2, 45-46 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
309 Valentine, supra note 39, at 532.
... See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
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market share may have been on the rise. 1' There is no evidence
that these effects were considered. However, when analyzed in
the context of U.S. merger law, it appears somewhat unlikely that
considerations of this nature would have been substantial enough
to challenge an otherwise acceptable merger.
The European Commission found the exclusive dealing
arrangements to be much more problematic. The Commission's
higher estimate of a 13% market foreclosure was viewed within a
legal environment considerably more hostile to vertical
agreements.1  The Commission added, without explaining the
relevance, the fact that these three airlines accounted for over 30%
of the U.S. market.313 The Commission also noted that the
exclusive deals were not confined to one type of aircraft, which
may reflect, although not explicitly, a recognition that these were
not necessarily quantity discounts (based on economies of scale),
but fidelity discounts."' 4  This appears consistent with the
following previously discussed EU economic assumption: "[T]he
fidelity rebate, unlike quantity rebates exclusively linked with the
volume of purchases from the producer concerned, is designed
through the grant of a financial advantage to prevent customers
from obtaining their supplies from competing producers."31"
In addition, the exclusive deals were directly relevant under
EU merger law, because they contributed to Boeing's dominant
position in the market. The Commission first noted the position
311 American, Delta, and Continental all currently operate mixed fleets to
varying degrees. Although all three have large amounts of MDC aircraft (47%,
27%, and 39%), only American had a significant percentage of Airbus aircraft
in its then current fleet (35 of 663). See EU Commission's Boeing Decision,
supra note 81, 69, at 27-28. This tends to suggest that Boeing's market share
was likely to increase in the future with its new exclusive customers.
However, it also suggests that Boeing already had much access to MDC
customers even absent the merger.
312 See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC
Competition Law, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 66-69 (1992) (asserting that in
antitrust law, the EU is more hostile than the U.S. to vertical agreements).
313 See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 46, at 23.
314 See id. 43-46; cf Case 85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. AG v.
Commission, 1979-2 E.C.R. 461, 462, 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 290 (1979) (finding that
the exclusive supply agreements were more suspect, because if a purchaser
bought one type of vitamin from a different supplier, it would lose its rebate
across the whoe spectrum of vitamins bought from the dominant firm).
31' Lewis, supra note 295, at 470 (quoting Case 85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche
& Co. v. Commission, 1979-2 E.C.R. 461, 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 290 (1979)).
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of these three airlines as crucial "launch customers"316 which could
otherwise facilitate new market entry." The Commission went
further, suggesting that the merger with McDonnell-Douglas
would significantly enhance Boeing's capacity to enter into more
exclusive dealing arrangements, cutting off major parts of the
market from competition.318  The Commission reasoned that
Boeing could now offer DAC aircraft and the provision of
additional spare parts and repairs for older DAC models as part of
the exclusive deals. 19 Furthermore, customers already having
firm orders for DAC aircraft could be permitted to cancel these
orders at no cost in return for exclusivity deals.32 As evidence for
this possibility, the Commission also stated that it is reported that
Boeing offered to exchange previously delivered MD-90 airplanes
with Delta in the context of negotiating an exclusivity deal.32'
The Commission also found it noteworthy that American, Delta,
and Continental ranked first, third, and fourth respectively with
respect to the size of their current MDC fleets,3" and that
"exclusivity deals had never before been entered into in the large
commercial aircraft sector and that their duration itself is
unprecedented.""
The European Commission further found it "quite feasible"
that Boeing would soon sign exclusivity deals with all of the top
ten airlines, foreclosing over 40% of the world market from
competitors.24 Citing Boeing's post-merger increases in product
range and financial resources, the Commission feared a "knock-
on" effect, whereby each major airline would find it necessary to
gain the cost advantages and shorter lead time (due to Boeing's
higher capacity) that competitors were receiving by signing with
Boeing.3  Furthermore, the Commission reasoned that, given the
current 28-31 year operating life of a large commercial airplane
311 See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 68, at 27.
317 See id.
318 See id.
319 See id.
320 See id.
321 See id. When asked by the Commission, Boeing neither confirmed nor
denied those arrangements. See id.
12 See id. 69, at 27.
323 See id.
324 See id. 71, at 28.
32s See id. 70, at 28.
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and the costs of switching manufacturers after such a long
relationship, the effects of the exclusive arrangements would last
much longer than twenty years. 26
2.4.4. In Sum
The U.S. authorities' focus on the overall structure and
concentration of the market- the crucial fact when assessing the
likelihood of competitor coordination- resulted in vertical
supply agreements appearing relatively outside of the scope of the
U.S. merger review process. Although noting that these
agreements were "potentially troubling" in their foreclosure
effect, the authorities found that this effect was not large enough
to warrant a challenge to the contracts under current U.S. law and
its assumptions regarding the procompetitive benefits of vertical
arrangements. The European Union, on the other hand, directly
focused on the effects of the exclusive deals on Boeing's market
position and was much more concerned. The European Union
also operated in the context of economic assumptions that were
comparatively more suspicious of vertical arrangements and in a
legal context in which these contracts were extremely relevant to
merger review. The Commission feared the ability of Boeing to
use the exclusive deals to create monopoly power and clearly
worried about the ability of Airbus (or any competitor) to
compete against a merged firm armed with extensive exclusive
supply contracts. The Commission further found that the merger
would increase the ability of Boeing, the dominant firm, to sign
similar exclusivity deals in the future, which would further
strengthen its dominant position. In short, both authorities
faithfully applied their laws, but with vastly different results.
3. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
3.1. The Settlement
The European Commission approved the Boeing/MDC
merger only after Boeing made numerous last minute concessions.
First, Boeing agreed to a number of conditions designed to
prevent its use of DAC to gain preferential access to its
326 See id. 71, at 28.
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customers."' Boeing agreed to maintain DAC as a separate legal
entity for 10 years. Although Boeing has the right to manage
DAC and make all relevant business decisions, it must make
periodic reports certified by an independent auditor regarding the
business performance of DAC and its commercial line.329 Boeing
agreed to maintain customer support for existing DAC aircraft at
the same level of quality as that provided for Boeing aircraft.3
Boeing also agreed that it would "not withhold or threaten to
withhold support for DAC aircraft ... or penalize" any customer
because that customer intends to purchase aircraft from Airbus
(or any other supplier), nor would it use preferential terms with
regard to servicing DAC aircraft in return for purchases from
Boeing. 31
Second, Boeing agreed not to enforce any of the three
exclusive supply agreements that it signed with Delta, American,
and Continental.3 Boeing also agreed that it would not sign any
exclusive agreements with any purchaser until August 1, 2007.
Third, Boeing agreed not to use its supply relationships
against Airbus or other aircraft manufacturers Boeing agreed
not to exert or attempt to exert "undue or improper influence on
its suppliers" by methods such as promising higher purchases,
subcontracting, or threatening to decrease these activities."'
Boeing is prohibited from using these tactics to induce suppliers
to limit their relationships with alternative manufacturers such as
Airbus.336
Fourth, Boeing made a variety of agreements designed to limit
the advantages that Boeing will enjoy from government related
funding such as publicly funded R&D for MDC's military
projects. Boeing agreed to license any patents or "know-how"
acquired through government funding to Airbus (or any other
commercial aircraft manufacturer) at reasonable rates upon
327 See id. 115.
328 See id. 115(1).
329 See id.
330 See id. 115(2)
331 Id. 115(4)
332 See id. 116.
3 See id.
334 See id. 119(1).
335 Id.
336 See id.
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request, 337 and to file reports with the European Commission
about unexpired patents for a period of ten years.33' Boeing also
agreed to supply information for ten years to the Commission
relating to non-classified R&D projects that are being undertaken
and to inform the Commission whether the project can be (or has
been) applied to commercial aircraft.339
3.2. Subsequent Events and BriefAnalysis
Having developed a clear understanding of why the two sides
of the Atlantic disagreed so profoundly on whether the
Boeing/MDC merger should be permitted, a brief substantive
critique on the analyses described in the previous sections is
appropriate. Making use of current economic understandings and
two years of hindsight, this article will attempt to assess whether
the Boeing/MDC episode sheds any light on either: (1) the
wisdom of the priorities set by each merger review system, or (2)
whether the economic assumptions used by each enforcement
body have theoretical and empirical support.
3.2.1. The Competitive Significance ofMcDonnell-Douglas
The apparent claim by the FTC that General Dynamics
considerations alone were sufficient to justify the Boeing/MDC
merger raises two questions with respect to the competitive
significance of DAC: (1) is it plausible that the FTC truly
believed that, based on the General Dynamics doctrine, Boeing's
acquisition of DAC had zero anti-competitive effects, and (2) if
the majority did silently extend the reasoning behind the failing
firm defense in order to further justify this transaction, is this
reasoning sound?
The FTC's claim that DAC had virtually zero competitive
effect on the market, as a stand alone basis, seems questionable. A
finding of zero anti-competitive effects would require evidence
sufficient to invoke the General Dynamics doctrine to re-
characterize MDC's market share from 4% to virtually 0%.340
Previous cases that involved a finding of virtually no competitive
significance appear to be much more extreme than the
337 See id. 117.
338 See id.
339 See id. 118.
340 See id.
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Boeing/MDC situation. The General Dynamics case itself
involved contemporaneous market share data that was based on
long-term coal supply contracts entered into many years before;
however, one of the involved firms had absolutely zero remaining
uncommitted coal reserves and was apparently unable to continue
to supply the market.34' In another case, Citizens & Southern, the
acquired banks were found to already be operating as de facto
branches of the acquiring bank so the merger was little more than
a formality. 42 If the evidence given by Airbus to the European
Commission about MDC's effect on prices is to be given any
weight, it would appear that MDC did have some effect on prices
in the very recent past, even if it is possible that this effect may
not have continued significantly into the future.
It is difficult to believe that DAC's existence as a separate
company would not have had some effect on prices in the
commercial aircraft market. As late as June 1996, DAC was still
considering plans for a new long-range aircraft, and American
Airlines was contemplating purchasing it.343  An American
Airlines executive stated at that time that MDC was "a potential
competitor in big airplanes."3" Although MDC dropped plans
for the MD-XX in the fall of 1996, signaling its uncertain future
in the commercial aircraft market,34  its existence as an
"uncommitted entrant" still could have had a salutary effect on
prices. 46
In addition, although many conclude that the decision to
concede the commercial aircraft market was a wise business
decision, it has been suggested that merger decisions could be
based on "strategic considerations" in anticipation of a possible
341 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
342 See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 92-94, 99
1975); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986)
discussing the Citizens & Southern case).
... See Jeff Cole, American Air May Weigh Buying McDonnell Douglas's
Biggest Jets, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1996, at B4.
344 See id.
341 See Anthony L. Velocci Jr., MD-XX Termination May Seal Douglas' Fate,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 4, 1996.
346 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, S 1.32. The guidelines
define an uncommitted entrant as a "firm not currently producing or selling
the relevant product in the relevant market." Id. The Agency will include
these firms in the relevant market, however, if their "inclusion would more
accurately reflect probable supply responses." Id.
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merger,347 and therefore, it is possible that MDC's decision could
have been made in anticipation of a possible merger with Boeing.
MDC abandoned its planned development of the MD-XX on
October 28, 1996, "8 and by December 3, 1996, MDC and Boeing
had signed an agreement to jointly develop a Boeing wide-body
passenger jet.349 The full scale merger was announced soon
afterward, on December 15, 1996.310 If any "strategic
considerations" were indeed at play in this decision, these
considerations increased the likelihood that MDC would have
remained active in the commercial aircraft market absent approval
of its merger with Boeing. However, analysts were predicting
that MDC would need a merger partner before the merger was
announced, 351 and the decision to avoid a new, risky investment
of billions of dollars was probably no more than an attempt to
maximize its share value in the face of stark market realities.
It is also difficult to accurately assess MDC's competitive
significance, given the vastly different answers by the airlines
surveyed by the FTC and the European Commission. Were
different airlines surveyed (U.S. airlines vs. European airlines)?
Did the different answers result from different types of questions?
Additionally, one can question whether (or which) airline
executives are truly aware of MDC's effect on prices, and why
Airbus would choose to oppose a merger that would decrease
competition, thereby increasing its ability to exert market power.
Unfortunately, neither enforcement body commented on these
questions, and a complete resolution of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
The FTC failed to address the possibility that the acquisition
of MDC would facilitate the exercise of market power by Boeing
by increasing its post-merger market share. The majority
... See, e.g., Statement of Commissioner Azcuenega, supra note 150.
348 See John Mintz, McDonnell Scraps Jumbo Jet; Firm Cites Competition;
Move Follows Firing of Head of Military Unit, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1996, at C-
4.
3 See Boeig,; McDonnell Douglas to Work Together: Deal's First Mission:
Bigger 747s, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1996, § 3, at 1.
350 See Jeff Cole, Air Power: Boeing Plan to Acquire McDonnell Douglas
Bolsters Consolidation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1996, at Al.
311 See Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., Market Focus, AVIATiON WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 25, 1996, at 11 (stating that MDC needs an acquisition, merger,
or other strategic move in order to increase stock value after losing its quest for
the Joint Strike Fighter).
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statement appeared to give no weight whatsoever to Boeing's high
market share and the effect of the merger in strengthening
Boeing's market position with respect to suppliers and customers
of MDC. Pitofsky himself has recognized the possibility of anti-
competitive repercussions from the acquisition of a firm with
little ability to compete on its own." 2 He stated in an article that
"a failing firm's assets can be of immense competitive significance
and the ability of a large firm to extract higher than competitive
profits can be augmented by acquisition of those assets."3 53 Given
the evidence collected by the FTC regarding the lack of interest in
future models and the subsequent progression of U.S. merger law
towards a more lenient view, it is admittedly conceivable that the
FTC commissioners could have truly viewed MDC's competitive
significance as de minimis. However, this conclusion is neither
obvious nor compelled from the facts.
Another important question that arises from the contrasting
views on MDC's competitive significance is what would have
happened if the merger was blocked. To this end, one might
wonder whether Boeing would have decided to abandon the
merger or merely attempted to acquire MDC and divest DAC. It
appears to be highly unlikely that any other purchasers were
available,354 but it is at least a possibility that could have been
considered more thoroughly.3 5 Although the FTC appeared to
analyze the merger in comparison to what would have happened
without the acquisition (concluding that DAC would soon exit),
the European Commission apparently measured the
"strengthening" of Boeing's position in absolute terms. The
Commission's analysis could have benefited from a stronger
realization that it should judge how much the merger
strengthened Boeing relative to how much the likely
alternative-DAC's exit-would have strengthened the company.
If the merger was blocked, both the FTC and the European
Commission assumed that MDC's commercial aircraft unit's
assets would eventually leave the market. The European
312 See Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 22, at 231.
353 Id.
... See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 58(iii), 60, at
25, 26; see also text accompanying note 202.
... Although the possibility of finding such a buyer was extremely
unlikely, one analyst reportedly suggested Bombardier, Inc. See Velocci, supra
note 351, at 11.
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Commission implied that this result would be preferable, in that
Boeing and Airbus could then compete on an equal footing for
MDC's customers. 56 The European Commission also preferred
this result because of the added flexibility and efficiency that
MDC's work force could give to Boeing."7 The FTC, however,
could have implicitly adopted failing firm considerations, and
believed that blocking the merger would have wasted assets that
could have been put to good use by Boeing and needlessly
punished shareholders and customers of MDC. The question
arises, therefore, whether the underlying assumptions of each was
valid.
It is questionable whether blocking the merger, at least in
part, to prevent Boeing's access to MDC's skilled work force
would have been effective at all. Since the European Union was
concerned significantly with access to MDC's engineers in its
defense and space side, the possibility that MDC would divest
DAC would still allow the acquisition of most of MDC's
engineers. Even ignoring this fact, however, it seems likely that
some or most of MDC's commercial aircraft engineers would
eventually have arrived at Boeing even absent the merger. Airbus
does not have production facilities in the United States, and DAC
operations and engineers, in Southern California, are not
extraordinarily far from Boeing's hub of operations in Seattle."'
In the event that MDC decided to spin off DAC rather than
attempt to find a new merger partner, the DAC engineers would
have had friends and contacts from MDC in Boeing. In fact, even
before the full merger was announced, the collaborative deal that
was announced on December 2 was largely meant to put MDC
engineers to good use and involve MDC engineers from Long
Beach in work in Seattle on Boeing aircraft.359 A Boeing official,
discussing the collaboration, stated that 'McDonnell Douglas has
excellent design and production capability- both in people and
facilities- that are not being fully utilized ... [w]e have a record
number of orders for commercial jets and several ongoing
356 This issue is addressed below in the discussion relating to the exclusive
dealing arrangements.
... See EU Commission's Boeing Decision, supra note 81, 65, at 26.
358 In addition, with its acquisition of Rockwell, Boeing had operations in
Southern California even without the addition of MDC. See Wilson, supra
note 242, at 44.
... See Boeing, McDonnell Douglas to Work Together, supra note 349.
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development programs."360 Thus, even absent a merger of DAC
and Boeing, it is likely that MDC engineers and equipment would
have found their way to Boeing's commercial aircraft business.
The FTC's use of failing firm or failing division considerations
appears to be at least partly justified in that the loss of DAC's
assets would have meant a serious loss for shareholders and
workers. The MD-95 has the potential to be a popular plane, but
it probably would not have been worth much absent the
combination with Boeing. Boeing has even considered creating an
eighty seat version of the MD-95 for the below-100 seat market, in
which Boeing traditionally did not compete,36' and presumably it
will supply the market with products it would otherwise have
been without (at least at such a low cost). Similarly, if DAC
workers and engineers were headed to Boeing anyway, it would
seem irrational to require Boeing to build new production
facilities in order to expand output, instead of merely allowing it
access to the underutilized DAC plant in Long Beach.362
3.2.2. Efficiency
Efficiency generated by the Boeing/MDC merger can be
expected to benefit Boeing itself and/or its customer airlines. It
is, perhaps, not extremely surprising, given political and legal
realities, that the European Commission did not give great weight
to prospective gains to Boeing in terms of company profits.
However, consideration of the possible cost-savings that could
benefit European airlines when buying from Boeing were also
absent from the European Commission's written opinion on the
merger. The European Union's consideration of efficiency issues
was likely hampered by questionable legal and economic
assumptions regarding the following two issues: (1) the likelihood
that Boeing would be able to use acquired efficiency gains to drive
Airbus from a substantial portion of the commercial aircraft
360 Id.
361 See Ralph Vartabedian & Karen Kaplan, Rosy Post-Merger Future Painted
for Douglas Plant; Aerospace: McDonnell and Boeing Chairmen Issue Upbeat
Assessment for 19,100-member Work Force in Long Beach, L.A. TIMES, July 24,
1997, at D1.
362 Cf Wilson, supra note 242, at 44 (i[G]iven the production levels at
which the Long Beach facility is capable of running, compared to its current
demand, Boeing should be able to move work into those plants far more
quickly than they could have designed and built new facilities around Seattle
and brought new workers up to speed.").
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market, which would allow Boeing to exert monopoly power in
the market, and (2) the likelihood of significant efficiency gains
being "passed on" to the consumers in the short and long term.
A complete resolution of these issues is clearly beyond the scope
of this article, but a brief comment is appropriate.
First, it is possible that the European Union ignored possible
efficiency gains because of its fear that increasing Boeing's market
share through efficiency and lower prices would lead, in the long
run, to Boeing's market dominance and an ability to raise prices
in the future to the detriment of its customer airlines. However,
concerns of predatory pricing by Boeing run into one serious
empirical obstacle: the ability of Boeing to recoup those losses in
the future.363 All political and economic factors point to the
conclusion that a decision by Boeing to attempt below cost
pricing in the hopes of driving Airbus and any other competitors
out of the market would be pure folly. Initially, one should note
that it is unlikely that Airbus would cede customers to a low-cost
Boeing too quickly. Even at extremely low prices, the Airbus
consortium has access to European governments who have
already proven their ability and desire to keep the company
afloat, even at the cost of high government subsidies.3 Rightly
or wrongly, given its public statements and history of
subsidization, it seems doubtful that the European Union would
permit Airbus to leave the entire commercial aircraft market to
its transatlantic rival.
Further decreasing the likelihood of future recoupment is the
strength and power of the airline industry. Major airlines are in a
strong position to resist significant price increases, even in a
future with Airbus confined to a much weaker market position.
The market clout of major airlines is significant, and it is unlikely
that they would be willing to pay supra-competitive prices for
... Compare Boeing's situation to the situation in Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), one of thie leading
U.S. Supreme Court cases on prectory pricing. InBrooke Group Ltd., the
Court refused to entertain a claim for predatory pricing because the plaintiff
was unable to demonstrate a likelihood of recoupment.
364 Boeing's continuous calls to end European subsidies to Airbus are still
being rejected by the Europeans. See, e.g., Jeff Cole & John Simons, U.S. and
Boeing May Try to Limit Airbus, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1999, at A3. European
governments are expected to provide $3.6 billion in loans in the event that
Airbus develops its proposed A-3XX "superjumbo" jet to compete with
Boeing's 747. See id.
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Boeing aircraft without considering shifting consumption towards
a weakened Airbus or a hypothetical new entrant. 6 It is
doubtful that the airline industry would take actions causing
Airbus to leave the aircraft market to a Boeing monopoly. In a
recent illustration of the ability of the airlines to play the two
aircraft manufacturing rivals against each other, Trans World
Airlines ("TWA"), in the market for 100-seat aircraft, agreed to
purchase fifty of Boeing's 717's, and seventy-five of Airbus' new
A318.366  As the Wall Street Journal reported, even the
"financially strapped [TWA], which hasn't turned an annual
profit since emerging from its second trip to bankruptcy court in
1995, succeeded in winning big discounts by pitting the two
manufacturers against each other."
367
Market regulators have also historically proven themselves
unable to predict changes in market structure that can result from
unanticipated innovations or other changes in technology and
market practice. 6 The possibility of significant changes of this
nature will further deter Boeing from engaging in the
extraordinarily risky long-term strategy that predatory pricing
would entail. This is especially true given the effect that below
cost pricing would have on current share prices and shareholder
support of management.36 9
365 See, e.g., Martha M. Hamilton, Fare Hikes By Airlines; Dept. Probe
Focuses on Pricing, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1989, at F1 ("The Justice Department
is investigating whether collusion was involved in fare increases earlier this
year initiated by American Airlines and quickly followed by other carriers.").
The airlines have proven their ability to exert market power when necessary.
See id.
31 See Frederic M. Biddle & Susan Carey, TWA Orders Jets From Rivals
Boeing, Airbus, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B2.
367 Id.
368 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET. AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST, 584-86 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing how regulators of the airline
industry were unable to anticipate the market structure that would result
when the market was left to its own devices and explaining that the "hub and
spoke" system that eventually developed in the air travel market "points out an
important lesson from economic regulation: it is difficult to predict what
unfettered competition will generate"). The book also quotes Alfred E. Kahn,
the former chairman of the CAB, for the following statement, "the essence of
the case for competition is the impossibility of predicting most of its
consequences." Id. at 586.
369 Nor is Boeing immune to takeover threats. See, e.g., Fearful Boeing: It
May Come as a Shock, but Even Boeing's Bosses Admit That the Firm is Vulnerable
to Predators, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27-Mar. 5, 1999, at 59.
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It is becoming increasingly clear that the projected efficiencies
from the Boeing/MDC merger have resulted in and are
continuing to spur the creation of a more efficient and modern
Airbus to the benefit of all airline customers. Contrary to the
European Union's fears, Airbus' position in the market looks
strong; the company controlled 46% of the market for 100-plus
seat passenger aircraft in 1998.7 Airbus has also begun
restructuring, not just to improve efficiency, but to make itself a
better strategic partner for other foreign businesses."' The
Boeing/MDC merger "prompted a far-reaching wave of activity
by the Europeans to consolidate their own national aerospace
companies into one big corporation that could deal with the new
American giant and the other huge U.S. defense contractor,
Lockheed Martin." 72
Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG ("DASA"), the successor
Airbus partner formed when Daimler-Benz merged with
Chrysler Corporation in November 1998, 37 recently agreed to
purchase two of the other three Airbus partners: Aerospatiale and
370 It was reported that Airbus had 556 firm orders in 1998 compared to
656 for Boeing. See Charles Goldsmith, Airbus Orders Hit a Record $39 Billion
in 98, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1999, at A14. Airbus has asserted that it actually
had a higher share of the market than Boeing in 1997, citing the fact that its
firm orders of 460 jets, when added to its preliminary orders of an additional
211, resulted in 671, compared to 568 for Boeing. See Charles Goldsmith,
Re-Engineering: After Trailing Boeing For Years, Airbus Aims For 50% of the
Market, WALL ST. J., March 16, 1998, at Al. Boeing contends that the better
comparison is its 568 "announced" orders compared to Airbus' 460 firm orders.
See id. Other reports from Boeing have suggested that Airbus' share of the
market in terms of overall value is about 41.5%. See Ian Brodie, Boeing Stuck on
the Runway As Airbus Adds to Production Woes, TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998.
Preliminary indications were that Airbus surpassed Boeing in firm orders
during the first nine months of 1999. See Daniel Michaels, Keeping the 'Family'
in Line Helps Airbus Beat Boeing on British Airways,WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1999,
at A6 (reporting that analysts believe Airbus recorded almost twice as many
firm orders of aircraft as Boeing as of October 12, 1999).
371 See European Companies Seek to Consolidate: Restructuring Sought in a 4-
Nation Consortium Competing Against Boeing, BALT. SUN, une 15, 1999, at 2D
(noting European aerospace firms' consolidations in order to compete with
U.S. rivals).
37 See Martin Sieff, Ready for Take oft? Europeans Eye Consolidation of
Aerospace Firms, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at A16.
"" See Dagmar Aalund, Car Merger Lends Boost to Profits, WALL ST. J., Dec.
28, 1998, at A9; Daniel Michaels, Daimler Deal with Casa Creates Inter-European
Aviation Firm, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1999, at A17.
[Vol. 20:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss4/3
A VOIDING ANOTHER NEAR-MISS
CASA. 74 In retrospect, the European Commission's fears
regarding possible predatory pricing driving Airbus from the
market seem greatly exaggerated.
The second area where EU law may be operating under
questionable legal and economic assumptions is in its analysis of
the relevance and likelihood of efficiencies being "passed on" to
customer airlines (and passengers). First, it will be noted that
whether or not efficiency gains are passed on to consumers, these
gains will still have a welfare-enhancing effect, although likely
confined to the producer. Economic literature seems to support
the view that efficiency gains to firms with strong market
positions will still result in significant gains to society as a whole.
In terms of total societal welfare, the leading commentator Oliver
E. Williamson has noted that even moderate merger-generated
efficiency gains can substantially outweigh the "deadweight loss"
associated with a monopolistic price rise."' Williamson
concluded that a mere 1.2% increase in efficiency will outweigh,
in terms of allocative efficiency, the effects of a 10% price rise. 6
Although the FTC did not address the issue of efficiencies, it
could conceivably have found the efficiency gains to Boeing in
terms of increased profit and gains to Boeing's shareholders (and
possibly employees) as important, even absent these gains being
"passed on" to consumers. However, if a stronger "passing on"
requirement was applied by EU authorities, one might question
the rationale behind this decision. The political reality is that,
absent the "passing on" of efficiency gains to Boeing's customers,
much of the efficiency gain in this case is likely to be concentrated
" See Daniel Michaels & Charles Goldsmith, Daimler and Aerospatiale
Matra Agree to Combine Their Aerospace Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1999, at
A3; Micheals, supra note 370.
... See Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1968, at 18 [hereinafter Williamson,
Economics]; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 699, 708-09 (1977) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies
Revisted]; see also W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL, supra note 368, at 203-06 (discussing
the welfare tradeoffs of mergers and evaluating the Williamson model).
376 See Williamson, Economics, supra note 375, at 22-23; Williamson,
Economies Revisited, supra note 375, at 708-09. This author notes that merely
analyzing overall welfare implications ignores important distributional effects
on consumers. Nevertheless, if the relevant governments were truly concerned
with the health of the commercial airlines, a direct transfer of wealth would be
more effective than preventing efficient mergers with undesirable distributional
effects.
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in the U.S. market. This is due to the fact that the commercial
aircraft industry is uniquely polarized with almost all of Boeing's
production facilities in the United States and all of Airbus' in
Europe."7 Thus, the already existing EU resistance to efficiency
considerations, especially absent those gains being passed on to
consumers, may have been exacerbated in this case, given that the
benefits from increased production efficiency and demand for
Boeing aircraft may be concentrated in Boeing stockholders and
workers who are likely mostly U.S. citizens. This raises a
controversial question, unfortunately beyond the scope of this
article, as to whether antitrust authorities engaged in a
"Williamson Tradeoff"37 analysis should be required to take into
account gains that would accrue in foreign markets. The author
will simply state his opinion that an honest antitrust enforcer
concerned with total "social welfare" would be compelled, when
dealing with international mergers, to take into account all
international welfare effects when deciding whether or not to
label a transaction as "anti-competitive."379
Second, even if one accepts the "passing on" requirement and
focuses on consumer welfare alone, there is no reason to believe
that efficiencies will not be passed on by Boeing to its customer
airlines. At the very least, it must be admitted that substantial
cost savings will most likely accrue to the U.S. government (and
taxpayers) as a purchaser of defense equipment from the merged
industry. One article even contends that the likelihood of
efficiency gains being "passed on" to consumers actually increases
with the market power of the merged firm, because smaller, price-
" However, this does ignore the important effects of cross-border
subcontracting. Boeing has extensive subcontracting activities in Europe, and
has claimed, for example, that work related to its 737 alone may create over
30,000 jobs in France over eight years. See Frederic M. Biddle, Boeing Goes
European to Soothe EU Fears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1997, at B6. Airbus similarly
asserts that it affects over 80,000 U.S. workers by means of its U.S.
subcontracting activities. See id.
378 See Williamson, Economics, supra note 375, at 22-23 (discussing the
welfare effects of mergers and the tradeoff of greater efficiency and the higher
likelihood of anti-competitive activity); Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra
note 375, at 708-09 (updating the original analysis).
... See Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The Harmonization of
Competition and Trade Law: The Case for Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to
Parochial State Action, WORLD COMPETrrION L. & ECON. REv. Dec. 1995, at
5 (suggesting a model of "world welfare" to guide the international community
towards substantive and procedural harmonization of antitrust law).
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taking firms do not have much control over the prices they
charge."'
The evidence seems to indicate that efficiency gains for
Boeing/MDC, even outside the military sector, will indeed be
enormous and much more significant than the negative effects
associated with an increase in market power. Some evidence of
merger-generated efficiencies being passed on to customers in the
commercial aircraft market are already evident."' One example is
the cost-reduction and spurring of competitive interest in the 100-
seat plane market. The MD-95, which was started by MDC and
continued by Boeing as the 717,382 had a list price of $30 to 35
million as of December 10, 1998. 383 As of April 4, 1998, Boeing
reportedly was offering the plane for less than $25 million.384
Demand for the 717 appears to be on the rise since it has been in
Boeing's hands in addition to the original launch customer for the
aircraft, which is AirTran Airlines (formerly known as Valujet385),
TWA has ordered the plane, and major European and Asian
380 See generally Paul L. Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger Efficiencies:
Reconsidering the "Passing On "Requirement, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 735 (1996).
Boeing executives suggested shortly after the merger that the distinction
between their complementary military and commercial aircraft will be blurred
in the future, and that, for instance, Boeing "may build military parts on
commercial lines." Kevin O'Toole, Defence Units Expect to Evade Boeing Axe,
FLIGHT INT'L, Feb. 11, 1998, at 20. In an example of efficiencies that may
directly benefit airline companies, Boeing is reportedly now able to use wing-
aerodynamics technology acquired from MDC to allow airlines to save 7% on
fuel used for jumbo jets. See For Their Next Trick. Airbus May Be About to
Challenge the Jumbo Jet's 30 Year Old Monopoly. How Can Boeing Respond?,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 27-Apr. 2, 1999, at 61, 62.
382 See Tim Smart, Boeing Rolls Another 7: Manufacturer Predicts Strong 717
Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1998, at G2 ("Boeing Co. yesterday rechristened
the MD-95 narrow-body jet it inherited in its merger with McDonnell Douglas
as the 717 .. ").
... See Biddle & Carey, supra note 366, at B2.
"' See Frederic M. Biddle, Boeing Unveils Ambitious Production Plan for
New 717Jetliner, WALL ST. J., April 28, 1998, at A4. Production of the 717,
however, has been plagued with production problems. See id.
38 See id. For an interesting suggestion that the May 1996 Valujet crash
may have been related to Valujet's relationship with the politically powerful
MDC, see Jeff Shear, Potentially Dangerous Liaisons, NATL J., July 11, 1996.
Shear notes that MDC produced both government and commercial aircraft in
politically important California, that Valujet's crucial agreement to purchase
MDC's MD-95 occurred in October 1995 (one year prior to the presidential
election), and that the FAA chief, who had permittedValujet to fly despite a
variety of inspection problems, was previously an executive of MDC. See id.
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leasing companies have also placed orders or expressed interest.386
Furthermore, in a move certain to further benefit consumers,
Airbus recently decided to proceed with plans to develop a rival
100-seat plane called the A-3182"z It is not clear that these new
values would have been fully available to customers absent the
Boeing/MDC merger.
Shortly after the merger (although not directly because of the
merger), the price of aircraft plunged. One Airbus executive
stated that, between 1996 and 1998, prices dropped by as much as
one-fifth, and operating margins at Boeing dropped to less than
3% in 1997,388 and even lower in 1998."'9 The fierce price
competition between Airbus and Boeing is not expected to lessen
in the near future, so cutting costs is likely to be the only way to
maintain profitability.3 ' The benefits to the commercial airline
industry of greater efficiency and lower prices are obvious. The
Boeing/MDC merger and the efficiencies it created has spurred
greater competition between Boeing and Airbus, as well as
continuously decreasing prices, which benefit commercial airlines
and passengers.391
386 See Biddle, supra note 384; Jeff Cole, Airbus to Proceed with 100-Seat
Plane, Clouding the Outlook for Boeing's Jet, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1999, at A4;
Guy Norris, Boeing Lines Up More Buyers For New 717, FLIGHT INT'L., Feb. 18,
1998. Hawaiian Airlines agreed to purchase thirteen 717 jetliners; Jeff Cole &
Susan Carey, Boeing Co. Nears Hawaiian Air Deal for $430 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 1999, at B14.
387 See Cole, Airbus to Proceed with 100-Seat Plane, supra note 386.
388 See Michael Skapinker, Boeing, Boeing, Bong: Michael Skapinker on the
Production Woes that Have Spoiled What Should Have Been a Bumper Period for
the US Aircraft Maker, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 1998, at 19 (discussing the
costly effect of production problems on an aircraft's profitability).
9 See James Flanigan & Leslie Helm, Brighter Skies for a New Boeing
Aerospace: As the Turbulence in Commercial Aircraft Continues, the Firm is
Cutting Costs and Fueling its Growth Through Military and Space Contracts, L.A.
TIMES, July 18, 1999, at C1.
" See id. Current information indicates that profit margins at Boeing
decreased further in 1998, although they were expected to return to between
3.5% and 4.5% in 1999, and the company aims for 7%. See id.
39 Interestingly, this situation of price competition and the absence of
collusion was likely a large contributor to MDC's decision to abandon the
commercial aircraft market. Although Boeing and Airbus were able to make
significant profits even with low margins (presumably because of scale), MDC
decided that the prices it would reaize Irom the development of its new
aircraft, the MD-XX, would be insubstantial. See Graham Warwick, Where
Next for MDC?, FLIGHT INT'L, Nov. 6, 1996, at 28. MDC may have been
unable to retain profitability absent collusion on price between itself, Boeing,
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3.3.3. Power over Suppliers and Customers?
The buying power of Boeing over its major aircraft suppliers
is indeed significant and could pose major dangers to the
competitive environment. The European Union's fears that
Northrop Grumman pulled out of its risk-sharing partnership
with Airbus 2 due to pressure from Boeing may be compounded
by the fear that Northrop's possible closer cooperation with
Lockheed Martin would leave the companies extremely
vulnerable to Boeing's influence.393 Current information may
indicate that Lockheed Martin is attempting to confine its
competition with Boeing to the military side, thus refraining
from direct support for Boeing's rivals in the commercial aircraft
market." 4
If the Boeing/MDC merger makes it more difficult for Airbus
to embark on new projects, such as the A3XX, competition in the
commercial aircraft market will be negatively affected. Not only
would this increase the likelihood that Boeing will maintain its
monopoly of the jumbo jet market, reaping super competitive
profits with its 747, but the mere threat of the A3XX's
introduction has the potential to remedy Boeing's leading firm
lethargy and lack of innovation.9 ' In fact, it has been reported
that the threat posed by the A3XX has caused Boeing to re-
evaluate whether its current jumbo jet product line is satisfactory
given customer demand and has possibly spurred the creation of a
new, larger version of the 747.396
and Airbus. The public comments of then-MDC President Harry Stonecipher
are illuminating and almost suspicious. He referred to pricing in the
commercial aircraft market as "absolutely silly... we're in a situation of rapid
growth in orders, yet the pricing is still marginal. Certainly it is for us." Id.
392 See supra text accompanying note 199.
393 In July 1998, the two companies abandoned plans for a merger after
they were unable to settle disagreements with the DOJ, which had filed suit to
block the merger. See Frederic M. Biddle & Thomas E. Ricks, Lockheed
Terminates Northrop Merger, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at A3.
311 See Jeff Cole & Anne Marie Squeo, Lockheed Martin, France's
Aerospatiale Discuss Joint Military-Aircraft Venture, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1999,
at A14; Vago Muradian, Lockheed Martin, France's Aerospatiale Discuss
Partnership, DEF. DAILY, Feb. 11, 1998.
31 See For Their Next Trick, supra note 381, at 61.
39' THE ECONOMIST reported that Boeing, after years of asserting that a
new superjumbo jet was not needed in the commercial aircraft market, has
begun consideration of a 550-seat 747. The best explanation for Boeing's change
of heart is the A3XX. See id.; see also Boeing Could Make Bigger 747 Models
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
Nevertheless, one must question how much bargaining power
Boeing truly has over companies such as Northrop and Lockheed
Martin, given that a rift between these companies and Boeing
could result in even closer cooperation between them and
Airbus- a result that Boeing clearly would fear. In particular,
"Lockheed Martin has made no secret of its desire to become
more closely allied with Airbus."39 Although Lockheed Martin's
recent overtures to Airbus seem strictly confined to cooperation
in military projects, links in the commercial market are not
unlikely. Lockheed Martin's position as a major competitor of
Boeing in the defense sector will likely help to insure the
company's independence from Boeing. Furthermore, the
likelihood of cooperation between Lockheed Martin and Airbus
has increased now that Airbus is beginning to transform itself into
a private company. The prospect of Lockheed Martin entering
the commercial aircraft market as a risk-sharing partner in the
A3XX, or even as an investor in Airbus in the event that it
becomes a single private company, is appearing less remote than it
has in the past.39
For the most part, Boeing's bargaining power with respect to
its primary customers (leasing companies and airlines)- although
undoubtedly powerful is based largely on the desirability of
buying Boeing rather than on anti-competitive leverage or
"dominance." In other words, Boeing does not appear to be
bullying the airlines into buying its planes. Instead, factors such
as Boeing's size and its technical know-how seem to permit it to
offer an excellent product to its customers. Because of this fact,
even with the undertakings by Boeing to the European
Commission, it will be difficult to adequately police the line
between "choosing a manufacturer forever and setting up
'Superjumbo'Airbus Jet Potential Rival, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 21, 1999, at 4
(reporting that plans by Boeing to "go ahead with larger and longer-range
versions of its 747 jetliner in the next two years" were likely the result of
Boeing's "hop[es] to stall a planned challenge from Airbus").
" Muradian, supra note 394. Connections between the two companies
could be further spurred by the fact that Lockheed Martin has expressed
interest in working with Airbus to create a military transport plane for
Europe. See Transatlantic Aerobatics: The Defence Industry is One of the Last
Bastions of Corporate Nationalism. But Now There are Signs that American and
European Defence Companies Are Trying to Come Together, ECONOMIST, June
5, 1999, at 59 [hereinafter Transatlantic Aerobatics].
398 See Transatlantic Aerobatics, supra note 397.
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exclusivity contracts which prevent airlines from changing their
minds."399 The incentives identified by the European Union to
sign large scale contracts with Boeing remain. Indeed, Delta has
since signed another supply agreement with Boeing,4" which may
be an attempt to circumvent the Boeing/EU settlement. The
result, as the European Union feared, will likely be strong
dependence on Boeing by many major carriers in the long term,
and market foreclosure for many launch customers. However, it
is likely that this situation would have developed even without
the merger.
The agreement between Delta and Boeing, combined with the
fact that American and Continental have not indicated that they
intend to purchase from Airbus, suggest that the exclusive
agreements could very well have been equivalent, in the sense of
providing true economic benefits for Boeing and the airlines.
This view was also strengthened by the mid-1997 supply
agreement between Airbus and the major U.S. carrier Northwest.
Although not an exclusive supply contract, the agreement's scale
is similar to that of Boeing's agreements; Northwest agreed to
spend about $2 billion for 50 Airbus planes and options for 100
more." 1 The Delta and Northwest developments suggest that
large-scale purchase agreements, which are not so different from
exclusive supply arrangements, result from the ability of each
aircraft manufacturer to meet customer demands of price, quality,
and stability- not from monopoly leveraging or single-firm
dominance.
In addition, it is possible that the European Union's concerns
were excessive, in that market foreclosure concerns may be
significantly lower in the commercial aircraft market. First, the
likelihood of new entry into this market appears extremely low,
so the existence of "launch customers" may be inconsequential.
Second, in a market with only two sellers, even 13% foreclosure is
not extremely significant in terms of overall market share-
"9 Delta, Boeing in Definitive Aircraft Agreements, AEROSPACE DAILY,
Oct. 23, 1997, at 122 (quoting a spokesman for EU Competition
Commissioner Karel Van Miert).
40 See id.
4' See Northwest Orders 50 Airbus Jetliners, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 1997, at
D3. Northwest has already converted 30 of these options into firm orders. See
Northwest Airlines: Options on Airbus Jetliners Converted to Firm Orders, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 1999, at B2.
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especially when large scale deals may be becoming the norm.
Third, the airline industry is relatively concentrated and would
likely move quickly to prevent the creation of a company capable
of exerting monopoly power and raising prices for the industry.
As one executive from Virgin Atlantic stated in explaining one of
his airline's recent Airbus purchases, 'Boeing makes excellent
aircraft... but it is in the interest of both the aircraft industry
and the consumer for them to have a strong competitor." 2 A
spokesman from United Airlines suggested that United maintains
a small amount of Airbus planes to preserve leverage over
Boeing' 3 Thus, it appears that the mere existence of Boeing's
three original exclusive deals neither demonstrated clear
dominance nor altered the market too extensively.
4. CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that historically differing legal
philosophies regarding the purposes of merger control, combined
with contrasting economic assumptions about the global
marketplace, resulted inevitably in the U.S. and EU antitrust
authorities profoundly disagreeing on whether to permit the
merger of Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas. The FTC perceived a
commercial aircraft market with only two significant
competitors, and a transaction in which one of these competitors
acquired a previously important but declining firm in the same
line of business. Any doubts about the benefits of this transaction
for the economy as a whole were likely allayed for the FTC by
the likelihood of the creation of immense efficiencies in the
commercial aircraft and defense industries, and the likely
prevention of significant losses and layoffs in the acquired
company's commercial aircraft division.
The European Commission, on the other hand, saw a
commercial aircraft market that was being increasingly
characterized by long term supply relationships with the leading
firm that threatened to undermine the ability of the rivals to
attract customers. The Commission perceived a transaction that
4 The Underdog Bites Back-Airbus Exploits its Chief Political and
Economic Asset: It's not Boeing, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at El.
403 The spokesman, Richard Martin said, "I think our actions speak for
themselves in the fact that we operate aircraft from both manufacturers." Id.
At the time the article ran, United maintained 42 Airbus narrowbodied planes
and 500 Boeing planes. See id.
[Vol. 20:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss4/3
A VOIDING ANOTHER NEAR-MISS
threatened to contribute powerfully to this trend and to provide
the leading firm with immense financial resources, new technical
skills, and unearned market share. The transaction would
significantly increase the dominance of the leading commercial
aircraft manufacturer, with undesirable economic and social
repercussions for the global market.
This article will not attempt to conclude which enforcement
body arrived at the correct answer, but it is clear that both bodies
ignored important economic factors in their analysis of the
Boeing/MDC merger. The FTC, concentrating predominantly
on market-wide effects on prices and the likelihood of
coordination between firms, failed to appreciate the significant
danger of increased market-dominance by Boeing. By
concentrating on MDC as a stand-alone concern, the FTC did not
take into account the power of MDC in Boeing's hands, especially
Boeing's increased market power resulting from its increased
market share and privileged access to new customers and
suppliers.
Furthermore, U.S. authorities, in doing their market analysis,
could have benefited from a better appreciation of the effects that
the MDC acquisition could have on Boeing's competitors-
specifically Airbus. The previous wave of exclusive dealing
arrangements threatened to foreclose many key customers to
Airbus and/or hypothetical entrants, and Boeing's increased
buying power threatened Airbus' attempts to challenge Boeing's
monopoly of the jumbo aircraft market. It seems difficult to
measure the implications of a merger on the commercial aircraft
market without examining exactly how each aspect of the merger
would affect the ability of other manufacturers to compete with
Boeing.
By ignoring the effects of the merger on Airbus, the FTC was
likely attempting to follow the wise counsel of the Supreme
Court that U.S. antitrust law "protect[s]... competition, not
competitors." " Perhaps, however, the FTC neglected to consider
the possibility that taking a more serious look at developments
that could undermine Airbus's ability to compete might be the
best way to maintain effective competition in the commercial
" Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis
added).
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aircraft market. In other words, in this market, maybe to some
extent protecting competitors is protecting competition.
The analysis of the European Commission would have been
improved if the Commission had a better appreciation for the
difficulty of showing "causation" in this case. In other words, the
factors identified by the European Union that strengthened
Boeing's market position may not have been solely a result of the
merger. In analyzing how the MDC acquisition would
"strengthen" Boeing's dominance, the Commission should have
instead compared the increased dominance resulting from merger
with the likelihood of increased dominance absent the merger.
Many of the advantages identified by the Commission with regard
to preferential access to MDC suppliers and customers would
also, to an extent, have been available to Boeing had DAC left the
commercial aircraft market without merging with Boeing. The
most obvious example of this was the Commission's failure to
appreciate that preventing the MDC acquisition would not likely
succeed in eliminating Boeing's preferential access to MDC's U.S.
employees.
Furthermore, the European Commission, saddled with an
excessively narrowly focused merger regulation, exacerbated the
situation by completely ignoring important economic and welfare
effects of the Boeing/MDC merger. By focusing almost
monomaniacally on the increased power of Boeing after the
merger, the Commission failed to consider the immense
efficiencies at stake with their corresponding benefits to global
welfare. The result was an analysis that inadequately quantified
the true benefits of the merger to the global market and to
Europe, especially in terms of lower prices and more efficient
manufacturing.
Similarly, the Commission skewed its analysis by treating
merger-effects, that would strengthen Boeing by increasing its
ability to satisfy its customers' demands, in the same way as
merger-effects that would increase Boeing's ability to gain market
share in a manner ultimately detrimental to its customers and
airline passengers. The Commission's analysis, although
consistent with EU law and previous practice, threatens to reject
mergers that could ultimately be beneficial to the world economy,
thus undermining the prospects for de-politicizing antitrust and
obtaining limited global consensus on antitrust policy.
In conclusion, it should be recognized that the recent
turbulence in U.S./EU relations resulted in part from a mostly
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inaccurate portrayal of enforcement bodies acting not under rule
of law but solely to protect their own "national champion."
Rather, the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger should be seen as
a case which highlighted important differences between U.S. and
EU legal philosophies, enforcement priorities, and economic
assumptions. This article attempted to highlight these differences
and to question the wisdom of the choices made by each
enforcement body when appropriate. The evidence suggests that
both U.S. and EU antitrust regulators under-appreciate at least
some important economic effects. The economies of the United
States and the European Union, as well as relations between the
two, would benefit greatly from the adoption of a more balanced
and comprehensive approach.
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